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Charles R. MeManist
Among the most far-reaching consequences of the Watergate inquiry
have been the continuing disclosures of questionable domestic and
foreign corporate payments.1 The revelations have shaken foreign gov-
ernments, 2 rocked American corporate management, 3 and tarnished
the image of American private enterprise both at home and abroad.'
* The author thanks Carol Clark and Kenneth Klein for their assistance in the early
stages of this article.
j Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Georgia.
1. As Senator William Proxmire has observed, "[The] wave of disclosures [of overseas
payment-] is really the result of sonic threads that began unraveling when the Vatergate
Special Prosecutor got into domestic bribery." Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings
on S. 3133 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bribes Hearings]. See INVVEsTOR Ri'sONSIBILITY
RESEARCI[ CENTER, INc., Tin CoRroRAi W%\rATtRGATE 1, 27-29, 59-63, A-I to A-55 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as CORPORATE W.TiERGATE). The number of disclosures continues to
grow. By mid-September 1976, over 200 firms had admitted making questionable pay-
ments abroad. Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1976, at 7, col. 1.
2. E.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1976, at 5, col. 3 (interim report by Japanese goierinent
on Lockheed Aircraft Corp.'s multimillion-dollar pa)off cites indictment of 15 persons,
including former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and other high-level officials); id., Aug.
27, 1976, at 4, col. 3 (Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands quits his public posts follow-
ing iniestigation of charges that lie accepted Sl.l million from Lockheed Aircraft Corp.);
id., Apr. 23, 1975, at 38, col. 2 (President Osnaldo Lopez ousted from office by
Honduran Supreme Military Council because of alleged receipt of ..1.25 million from
United Brands Co.).
3. The disclosures have toppled corporate managers from office or board member-
ship, forced them to reimburse their firms for unrecoverable payments and corporate
fines, and subjected them to criminal penalties. See CORPORATE WATERGATE, supra note
1, at A-3 to A-46; N.Y. Times, June 5, 1976, at 26, col. 4; id., May 29, 1976, at 1, col. 5;
id., Jan. 14, 1976, at 1, col. 2. Many exectithes also have lost their positions on other
corporations' boards of directors, id., May 7, 1976, § D, at 3, col. 1, though most have
retained their substantial pensions, id., Aug. 24, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 2, and 7, col. 1.
A number of firms have reorganized their management to vest more power in outside
directors or to strengthen auditing capabilities of the boards of directors. See CORPORATE
WATI-RGATE, supra note 1, at A-7, -12, -41, -42, -46.
4. See, e.g., Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearing on S. 3133, S. 3379 & S.
311S Before the Senate Comm. on Banking. Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 43 (1976) (letter from Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Commerce and Chairman of
Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad, to Senator William Proxmire)
[letter hereinafter referred to as Task Force Letter; hearing hereinafter cited as Foreign
Officials Hearing]; Lockheed Bribery: Hearings Before the Senate Conm. on Banking,
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These repercussions have spurred efforts to investigate questionable
corporate payments and to devise appropriate executive and legisla-
tive responses.
Landmark legislation has been enacted to curb corporate corruption
of the domestic political process.5 The foreign aspects of the problem,
however, have so far remained intractable. Despite agreement that
payments by American-based firms to public and private officials
overseas threaten both the foreign relations of the United States" and
the long-term interests of the firms themselves,- no consensus on so-
lutions has emerged.
The lack of consensus cannot be attributed to insufficient or con-
troverted information about the mode of overseas corporate payments.
Indeed, the extensive investigations undertaken by a presidential task
force,8 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),9 and three
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975) (statement of William Simon,
Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as Lockheed Hearings]; Bribes Hearings,
supra note 1, at 68 (statement of Leonard Meeker, Center for Law and Social Policy);
Wash. Post, June 13, 1976, § C, at 3, col. 4 (quoting Lloyd Cutler, Wilmer, Cutler S
Pickering); FORTUNE, Mar. 1976, at 27, 28.
5. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (West
Sept. 1976 Pamphlet).
6. See, e.g., Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 42 (Task Force Letter); De-
partment of State News Release on the International Problem of Bribery (Mar. 5, 1976)
(statement of Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll) (on file with Yale Law journal);
Activities of Anerican Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on International Economic Policy of the House Conm. on International Relations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1975) (Rep. Robert Nix) [hereinafter cited as MNC Activities
Hearings]; Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 12, at 386 (1975) (D.J. Haughton, chairman of the
board, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Policy Hearings].
7. See, e.g., Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 42-43 (Task Force Letter); SEC
Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, CCH FED:L
SECURITlES Lmv Rrt'oiRTs No. 642, pt. II, at 15 (May 19, 1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Report]; Solomon & Linville, Transnational Conduct of American Multinational Corpora-
tions: Questionable Payments Abroad, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COai. L. RLv. 303, 318 (1976)
(summarizing public statements of SEC Commissioners); Bribes Hearing, supra note 1,
at 19 (Ralph Nader, Center for the Study of Responsive Law, quoting Fred Allen,
chairman of the board, Pitney-Bowes, Inc.).
8. The Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad is a Cabinet-level
group established by President Ford ois March 31, 1976 "to conduct a sweeping policy
review" of the overseas payments problems and "to formulate a coherent national policy"
to deal with it. Bribes Hearings, supra note 1, at 81 (statement of Elliot Richardson,
Secretary of Commerce and Task Force Chairman). The first major policy statement by
the Task Force was embodied in a June 11, 1976 letter from the Task Force Chaifman
to Senator Proxmire, which is reproduced in Foieign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at
39-67. The Task Force helped draft the Administration's bill to require corporations to
report payments to the Secretary of Commerce. The bill was introduced as S. 3741, 91th
Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. Rec. S13807 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976), and H.R. 15119, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CoNe. REc. H8658 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1976) [citations hereinafter to the
Senate bill only]. See Towell, Foreign Bribes Bill Readied for Senate Action, 34 CoNc. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2333, 2336-37 (1976).
9. See Murphy, Payoffs to Foreign Officials: Time for More National Responsibility,
62 A.B.A.J. 480 (1976). On the basis of its investigation, the SEC has brought suit
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congressional committees10 have painted a detailed portrait. The term
"corporate payments abroad" encompasses a variety of practices, some
legal under local law and some not, designed to influence the political
process of a foreign country-to aid a political party," to expedite
governmental selvices, 1 or to shape a policy decision.' 3 Some payments
have been agents' or consultants' fees,' 4 which may be tax-deductible
business expenses.' 5 Some evidently have been bribes to government
against a number of American corporations to enjoin them from violating the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970), by failing to disclose questionable pay-
ments whose existence was material to investors. Lowenfels, Questionable Corporate Pay-
inents and the Federal Securities Laws, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1976); SEC Report,
supia note 7, at 2-6. The substance of the complaints filed by the SEC is described in
Solomon & Linville, supra note 7, at 322-25. Pursuant to the consent decrees obtained by
the SEC, several corporations have issued reports on their overseas payments. The re-
ports aie individually summarized in SEC Report, supra note 7, at B-I to B-20. Some-
what less detailed haic been the filings made with the SEC by over 60 firms that
responded to the Commission's encouragement of -voluntary" disclosure of improper
payments. See Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Undcr the
Securities Acts, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1848, 1851-53 (1976). For criticism that the SEC's actions
ha~e transcended the agency's legal authority, see Lowenfels, supra at 3-7; Note, supra
at 1862-63.
A less sWeeping imestigation has been made by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to
ensure that international carriers have met the reporting and accounting requirements of
the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1377 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See MNC Activities
Hearings. supra note 6, at 80-86 (James Weldon, Jr., Acting Director, Bureau of Enforce-
ment, CAB).
10. The congressional investigations have been spearheaded by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, and
the House International Relations Committee. See notes 1, 4 & 6 supra (citing congres-
sional hearings).
11. E.g., Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 316-19, 323, 339-40 (Mobil Oil con-
tributions in Ital)); SEC Report, supra note 7, at B-3 (Ashland Oil contributions in
Canada); Wall St. J., May 13, 1976, at 10, col. 2 (International Telephone and Telegraph
contiillutions in Chile); id., Dcc. 31, 1975, at 10, col. 5 (Gulf Oil contributions in Italy
and Bolivia); id., Nov. 20, 1975, at 20, col. 4 (Exxon contributions in Japan).
12. SEC Report, supra note 7, at 26-27. These "grease" payments are allegedly an
integral part of doing business in many countries. See Foreign Officials Hearing, supra
note 4, at 41 (Task Force Letter); Bribes Hearings, supra note 1, at 54 (statement of Ian
MacGregor, Chairman of United States Council of International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), citing remarks of Lord Slhawcross, Chairman of ICC Commission on Unethical
Practices).
13. E.g., Lockheed Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 (Lockheed payments made to secure
contracts with unidentified foreign governments); Wall St. J., May 24, 1976, at 30, col.
I (Exxon kickbacks on natural gas contract with subsidiary of Italian government's oil
company); id., Dec. 22, 1975, at I, col. 4 (Ashland Oil bribe made to obtain oil drilling
permits in Gabon); id., Aug. 19, 1975, at 7, col. I (United Brands payment made to
obtain banana tax reduction in Honduras).
14. E.g., Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 107-08, 112-13, 120-22 (Northrup
Corp. paid foreign agents or consultants inflated fees or commissions, which were passed
on to officials in Saudi Arabia, NATO, and the Common Market countries); id. at 349-53,
377, 385-91 (same by Lockheed Aircraft Corp. in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines); Wall St. J., May 24, 1976, at 11, col. 1 (Otis Elevator's foreign payments in
unspecified countries often were "commission fees" and "consulting fees"); id., Aug. 8,
1975, at 8, col 2 (Ashland Oil, Inc., paid "consultants" in Nigeria and Libya).
15. Comnpare Comment, Paynents to Foreign Officials by Multinational Corporations:
Bribery or Business Expense and the Effects of United States Policy, 6 CAL. IV. INT'L
L.J. 360, 370-71 (1976) (payments to overseas agents tax-deductible as legitimate expense
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officials, 0 which are widely prohibited. 17 Others have been political
contributions,Is the legality of which differs from country to country.10
Many payments, whether legal or illegal, have been made indirectly
through special funds, sales agents, or foreign subsidiaries.20 The flow
of money has been obscured by a variety of disguises.2 '
Though the mode of overseas corporate payments has been estab-
lished, and indeed previously may have been known by certain
United States officials, 22 the motivation for such payments has been
of doing business, provided that they were reasonable compensation) with id. at 372
("compensation" used simply as conduit for payments to government officials does not
constitute deductible business expense). Cf. SEC Report, supra note 7, at 27-28 (making
same distinction for purposes of imposing disclosure requirements).
16. E.g., Lockheed Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. paid senior
government officials in several countries); Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1975, at 10, col. 3 (Merck
& Co. paid primarily lower and middle-level bureaucrats in 36 countries); id., Apr. 14,
1975, at 1, col. 1 (United Brands Co. paid high government official in Honduras).
17. According to John J. McCloy, who chaired a special committee of the Gulf Oil
Corporation's board of directors that investigated overseas payments, "[The Gulf com-
mittee] could not identify a single country where a bribe of a government official to
induce a government to enter into a contract with any company for the supply of its
product to that government was not illegal in that country." Bribes Hearings, supra note
1, at 6. See id. at 65 (Leonard Meeker, Center for Law and Social Policy); id. at 103
(Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Commerce).
18. See note 11 supra.
19. Compare, e.g., Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 10, 33-35 (Gulf Oil's
contributions apparently illegal under South Korean law) with id. at 320-21 (Mobil Oil's
contributions apparently legal under Italian law, though provision of law requiring dis-
closure may have been violated) and CORPORATE N. TERG.TL, supra note 1, at 62 (political
contributions from corporate funds legal in Canada).
20. The devious means employed to establish and maintain special funds for ques-
tionable payments abroad are described in AINC Activities Hearings, supra note 6, at
41-42 (statement of Donald Alexander, Commissioner of Internal Revenue). For am ac-
count of Northrop Corporation's intricate arrangements, see SEC Report, supra note 7,
at B-17 to B-18. Foreign sales agents have been frequent conduits for payments to rank-
ing government officials. E.g., MNC Activities Hearings, supra note 6, at 99 (Northrup
Corp. in Saudi Arabia); Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. in
Indonesia). Payments have also been funneled through foreign subsidiaries. E.g., SEC
Report, supra note 7, at B-3 (Ashland Oil, Inc., in Canada); Wall St. J., July 18, 1975,
at 12, col. 2 (Mobil Oil Corp. in Italy); id., July 16, 1975, at 8, col. 3 (Exxon Corp. in
Canada).
21. Virtually every questionable corporate payment has been concealed by means of
falsified or inaccurate records. SEC Report, supra note 7, at 3, 13. Payments have also
been masked through purported sales commissions, consulting fees, advertising expenses,
insurance refunds, legal fees, and employee bonuses, MNC Activities Hearings, supra
note 6, at 83 (statement of James Weldon, Jr., Acting Director, Bureau of Enforcement,
CAB); through corporate lobbying "covers," Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at
124-26, 129-30, 155-67 (Northrop officer and director); through sham invoices and secret
bank accounts, id. at 243, 248-49 (Archie Monroe, controller, Exxon Corp.); and through
representation as entertainment expenses, Comment, supra note 15, at 361 n.4.
22. E.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, at I, col. 3 (U.S. embassy officials reportedly in-
formed of South Korean "requests" for corporate payments); id., July 15, 1976, at 1,
col. 3; id., July 18, 1976, § IV, at 2, col. 2 (Aluminum Co. of America reports to SEC
that U.S. ambassador solicited S25,000 for foreign officials and political parties; country
later reported to be Jamaica); id., Apr. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 1; id., Apr. 4, 1976, § IV, at 2,
col. 2 (alleged CIA awareness of Lockheed bribes in Japan).
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more difficult to ascertain. Most corporate representatives who admit
having made payments that were illegal under local law insist that
they did so in response to political pressure ranging from low-level
bureaucratic stalling to high-level threats of imminent expropriation
or expulsion. Available evidence suggests that such pressure is not
uncommon.2 3 Yet recent disclosures make it increasingly clear that in
many instances overseas payments have been made with little or no
coercion by the host government. Rather, American firms have dis-
bursed corporate funds to gain advantage over other firms seeking
foreign government concessions or contracts. 24 Indeed, notwithstand-
ing the assertion of some American corporations that overseas pay-
ments must be made to meet foreign competition,2  a number of
payments evidently have been made to overcome American com-
petitors.2-6
Payments made to influence foreign governmental decisions con-
cerning the operations of American firms are the focus of this article.
These payments can be viewed as an overseas manifestation of two
interrelated problems that are of increasing domestic urgency: the
problem of corporate accountability to shareholders and the gen-
23. Gulf Oil Coiporation, for example, felt compelled to make $4 million in arguably
illegal political contributions to the ruling party of the Republic of South Korea.
Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 9-10, 16-17, 21-26, 29-31; Report of the Special
Review Committee of the Board of Directors of Gulf Oil Corporation, at 93-105, SEC v.
Gulf Oil Corp., Civ. No. 75-0324 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 30, 1975) (report issued pursuant to
injunctive order) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Lesser amounts may ha~e gone to
Korean politicians as a result of several commercial ventures into which Gulf was pres-
sured. Id. at 111-22. Finally, some unascertainable portion of more than S4 million,
billed as travel and entertainment expenses over a four-year period, was spent by Gulf
to lubricate the "'wheels of progress'" in Korea. Id. at 105-08. One particular "'off-the
books'" luind, used to expedite routine governmental action, disbursed approximately
s33,0toI in three years. hli. at 108-11.
24. E.g., Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 178-79 (Thomas Jones, president
and chairman of the board, Northrop Corp.); id. at 353-56, 380-82 (D.J. Haughton,
chairman of the board, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.). See SEC Report, supra note 7, at
25-26.
25. E.g., Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 353-56, 371-72, 380-82 (D.J. Haughton.
chairman of the board, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.); Lockheed Hearings, supra note 4, at 27
(statement of D.J. Haughton); Bribes Hearing , supra note 1, at 48-49 (Ian MacGregor,
chairman of U.S. Council of International Chamber of Commerce). Half the businessmen
replying to one survey stated that they felt such pa)ments should be made to meet
foreign competition. Kugel & Gruenberg, International Payoffs: Where Tle Are and How
We Got There, CIILLENGr, Sept./Oct. 1976, at 13, 14.
26. Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4. at 42 (Task Force Letter). E.g., Bribes
Hearing, supra note 1, at 39 (George Ball, Lehman Brothers, regardillg Lockheed pay-
ments in Japan); Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 136-37 (Richard Millar,
director of Northrop Corp.); id. at 165-67, 178-79, ('homas Jones, Northrop president
and chairman of the board); Wall St. J., May 11, 1976, at 3, col. 1 (SEC alleges that
General Tire and Rubber Co. paid agent to persuade French bank not to make loan to
American competitor planning to build plant in Chile).
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eral public27 and the problem of industrial concentration, which
tends to encourage anticompetitive practices.2 1 Awareness of both as-
pects pinpoints the inadequacy of recent proposals for dealing with
overseas corporate payments and aids evaluation of the potential ef-
fectiveness of existing remedies, both those designed to ensure cor-
porate accountability and those designed to preserve competition.
This article examines recent proposals and notes that all neglect
the anticompetitive effects of overseas payments. It observes the same
shortsightedness in current efforts to initiate diplomatic solutions and
to adapt existing legal mechanisms for ensuring corporate account-
ability. Finally, it argues that the antitrust laws provide a more effec-
tive approach to both the accountability and the anticompetitive
aspects of corporate payments abroad.
I. Recent Proposals
Both the executive and the legislative branches recently made pro-
posals for dealing with overseas payments. None of these proposals at-
tacked the phenomenon as a threat to American competition over-
seas. The proposals of President Ford's Task Force on Questionable
Corporate Payments Abroad seemed to conceive of overseas payments
as essentially a diplomatic problem. Those of the SEC apparently
27. See R. NADER, IN. GREEN & J. SELIGMIMN, T..MING THE GIANT CORPORATION 75-77,
79-80 (1976) (payoffs reflect management's unrestrained control of corporations). See gen-
erally A. BERLE & G. MEXNS, TiE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVAr PROPERTY 128-31
(rev. ed. 1968) (means of shareholder control of management has weakened, leaving
management with almost complete discretion); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 698-701 (1974) (criticizing tendency of
management to seek freedom from shareholders, government, and public opinion);
Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theoiy: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 253-55 (1969) (lack of shareholder control over
management and corporate policy); Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate
Management Responsible?, in THE COR1PORATION IN 'MODERN SOCIETY 46, 51-56 (E. Mason
ed. 1959) (discretion of corporate directors and managers virtually unfettered by share-
holders).
28. "Since oligopoly markets are characterized by lack of price competition, inter-
national payoffs become a kind of nonprice competition .... " Kugel & Gruenberg, supra
note 25, at 19. See generally C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 104-06 (1965)
(detailing methods by which firms in concentrated markets engage in anticompetitive
practices); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 27, at 213-14 (concentration
enables firms to engage in parallel pricing and price leadership); White House Task
Force Report on Antitrust Policy (July 5, 1968), reprinted in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REGULTION REPORT No. 411 Special Supp., pt. II, at 3 (1969) (current level of economic
concentration "precludes effective market competition and interferes with the optimum
use of economic resources"); Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Anti-
trust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 184, 231-33 (H. Goldschmid,
H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974) (surveying over 40 studies of profits and concentration
and concluding that opportunity for collusion or mutual restraint in concentrated in-
dustries results in higher prices and profits).
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regarded overseas payments as a problem solely of managerial account-
ability to shareholders. Near the close of the last term of Congress, the
Senate finally recognized that neither of these conceptions provides a
foundation for adequate policy. Yet it too failed to draft legislation
confronting the anticompetitive character of many overseas payments.
The Task Force proposed legislation that would have treated all
questionable expenditures as extortion payments and the entire prob-
lem as primarily one of foreign relations.209 American firms would
have been required to report any payment above a certain amount
to the Secretary of Commerce, who in turn would have disseminated
the reports to other appropriate federal agencies. 30 The affected
foreign government would have been notified of such reports at the
discretion of the Secretary of State.3' The reports would have been
made public one year after being filed with the Secretary of Com-
merce, unless the Secretary of State or the Attorney General deter-
mined that disclosure would be inadvisable. 32 Either civil or criminal
penalties could have been imposed for failure to report.33
If the sole motivation for overseas payments were host government
coercion, the proposals of the President's Task Force might be satis-
factory. Mandatory disclosure of extortion payments, backed by stiff
penalties for nondisclosure, might provide the truly victimized cor-
poration with some incentive to resist extortion demands if the cost
of resistance were low and to refer the matter to the State Department
if the cost of resistance rose. By the same token, such a policy might
spur diplomatic efforts to discourage would-be extorters. Intergovern-
mental dialogue may be the most promising means to reduce such
extortion.
To characterize all overseas payments as extortion payments, and
therefore as a diplomatic problem, however, is inaccurate; some pay-
ments are clearly bribes. Admittedly the line between extortion and
bribery may prove illusory in many instances; corporations may read-
ily accede to pressure because they see that competitive advantage
can be gained thereby. Yet the distinction is important, because those
questionable transactions in which American firms are more instiga-
29. See note 8 supra (citing sources). It should be noted that payments intended to
influence the conduct of foreign governments concerning disputes with the United States
could violate the Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1970).
30. S. 3741, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3, 8(a) (1976) (mentioning Departments of Justice
and State, IRS, and SEC).
31. Id. § 8(b).
32. Id. § 8(a).
33. Id. §§ 6, 7.
The Yale Law Journal
tors or partners than victims3 4 involve issues of managerial account-
ability and antitrust policy. To these issues the Task Force proposals
do not effectively speak. Aggressive competitors might continue to
conceal their questionable practices rather than risk disruption of
profitable overseas transactions. Where such corporations did decide
to disclose, they might do so only to encourage acquiescence by the
executive branch, thereby involving the United States government
more deeply in illicit practices abroad.3 Even if the executive branch
did take action, diplomatic initiatives would hardly be appropriate:
entreating foreign governments to keep their officials from accepting
proffered payments from American corporations would be awkward
at best.
In contrast to the Task Force proposals, the bill introduced at the
request of the SEC focused on perceived weaknesses in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and sought to remedy them through amend-
ments imposing stringent accounting requirements." The bill thus
implied that the SEC, the traditional monitor of managerial impro-
prieties, would be the appropriate body to combat questionable pay-
ments abroad. Rigorous recordkeeping would presumably restrict man-
agerial conduct that might reduce the value of the corporation's se-
curities.
This vision of the questionable corporate payments problem clearly
differs from that of the Task Force. But it is a vision no less narrow.
For the Task Force, the problem is one of diplomacy; for the SEC, it
is one of accountability to shareholders."- Yet owners of registered se-
curities are not the only ones injured when their corporation bribes
a foreign official, makes an improper political contribution, or pays
inflated agents' fees. Indeed, even where shareholders profit from
their corporation's overseas payment, competitors, other American
firms in the foreign market, and the foreign government itself may
suffer economic harm. Because the SEC and the Task Force failed to
appreciate the anticompetitive aspects of questionable corporate pay-
ments, their proposals provide no remedies for these victims of the
practice.
On their own initiative, members of the 94th Congress introduced
numerous bills and amendments to combat the problem of question-
34. See p. 219 & note 26 supra.
35. See p. 218 & note 22 supra.
36. S. 3418, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in Foreign Officials Hearing, supra
note 4, at 36-37. The bill's nominal sponsor described it as "the Comnmission's own
proposal." Id. at 1 (Sen. Proxmire). The bill sought to amend 15 U.S.C.A. § 78re(b)
(West June 1976 Pamphlet).
37. Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 5 (Roderick Hills, SEC Chairman).
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able overseas payments. 38 The diversity of these proposals testified
more to a broad congressional desire for action than to a congressional
consensus on what action to take. The most sweeping proposals to pass
either House were those embodied in the bill reported by the Senate
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee and introduced by
the Committee chairman, William Proxmire." The bill passed the
Senate unanimously40 but reached the House too late in the term to
be considered.41 The bill incorporated the recordkeeping proposals of
the SEC,42 but it went beyond the SEC's requirements of disclosure
to investors. 43 First, it would have prohibited corporations under SEC
jurisdiction from "corruptly" offering or making payments to any
foreign individual or political party for the purpose of inducing the
38. Two laws enacted during the last Congress had provisions concerning questionable
payments abroad. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, [1976] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws (90 Stat. 1520), requires unfavorable tax treatment of such payments:
§ 1065(a)(1) includes as taxable income of American shareholders of a "controlled foreign
corporation" their pro rata share of corporate funds expended for illegal payments un-
der I.R.C. § 162(c) (see pp. 226-27 infra); § 1065(a)(2) includes as taxable dividends of
American shareholders of a "Domestic International Sales Corporation" (DISC) their pro
rata share of corporate funds expended for illegal payments under I.R.C. § 162(c) (see
pp. 226-27 infra); and, § 1065(b) provides that earnings and profits of a foreign corpora-
tion cannot be reduced for tax purposes by the amount of illegal payments under I.R.C.
§ 162(c) (iee pp. 226-27 infra). The International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, [1976] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS (90 Stat.
729), requires American firms to submit to the Secretary of State, and through him and
the President to Congress, "a description of each payment, contribution, gift, commission,
or fee" in connection with certain "sales of defense articles or defense services," id.
§ 604(a), (b), and authorizes the President to prohibit, limit, or condition such payments
by regulation, id. § 604(b).
A number of other congressional proposals failed to become law. Two Senate bills
emphasizing public disclosure of questionable payments were introduced. S. 3133, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 30-31;
S. 3379, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note
4, at 32-36. These bills were superseded by a bill, cited at note 39 infra, that eventually
passed the Senate.
In the House three bills were introduced. H.R. 7563, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG.
REC. H4853 (daily ed. June 3, 1975), which died in the International Relations Com-
mittee, would have required the State Department to monitor overseas activities by
American firms and report federal violations to the appropriate governmental agency.
H.R. 7539, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CoNG. Rrc. H4852 (daily ed. June 3, 1975), which
died in the Judiciary Committee, would have made bribery of foreign governments, of-
ficials, or political parties a criminal violation. MNC Activities Hearings, supra note
6, at 4 (Rep. Solarz). H.R. 14681, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. H7221 (July 1,
1976), which passed the House but died in the Senate, would have provided for "termi-
nation of investment insurance and guaranties issued by the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation in any case in which the investor makes a significant pa)ment to an official
of a foreign government for the purpose of influencing the actions of such government."
H.R. 14681, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. preamble (1976).
39. S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. Rrc. SI1768 (daily ed. July 19, 1976).
40. 122 CONG. Rrc. S15682 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1976).
41. Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1976, at 4, col. 2.
42. S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1976).
43. See S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976).
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recipient to exert influence on a foreign government to assist in "ob-
taining or retaining business . . .or influencing legislation or regula-
tions of that government.14 4 Second, it would have applied the same
prohibition to all corporations beyond the reach of the 1934 Act.45
Although the Proxmire bill's prohibition properly would have en-
compassed the thousands of corporations outside the SEC's jurisdic-
tion,40 its breadth would have raised considerable administrative dif-
ficulties. The bill would have vested the SEC and the Department of
Justice with vast new enforcement responsibilities, but it would not
have provided them with an underlying conception of the overseas
payments problem that would identify which payments are most per-
nicious and therefore merit greatest attention.4, Had the Proxmire
bill, in contrast to the Task Force and SEC proposals, stressed that
overseas payments injure American competition for foreign markets,
it would have given both purpose and direction to the enforcement
efforts of the SEC and the Department of Justice.
Both the prospects for and the desirability of enacting the various
recent proposals depend largely on whether the current international
and domestic legal structures prove capable of meeting the challenge
posed by questionable corporate payments abroad. The State Depart-
ment's belated support for the voluntary code of conduct for trans-
national enterprises adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) hardly justifies complacency. 4a
The Task Force concedes as much by outlining further international
efforts being made through the General Agreement on Tariffs and
44. S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1976).
45. Id. § 3.
46. According to the Senate Banking. Housing and Urban Affairs Comnmittee,'Home
20,000 large and small U.S. based exporters are not currently subject to SEC reporting
requirements." S. Rr,. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976).
47. The Committee did not intend the bill to prohibit "low-lesel facilitating pay-
ments sometimes called 'grease payments.' " Id. at 6. The Committee did not differentiate
among the remaining kinds of payments that would have been co~ered by the bill.
48. The OECD's Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Lntei-
prises was endorsed by 23 of the 24 member-states in June 1976 (with Turkey abstaining).
OECD Press Release A(76) 20 (June 21, 1976), reprinted in 15 INI'L Lrc,,\L MAILRIALS
967, 972 (1976). Tbis code of conduct has been touted as one Clement of the **current
Administration approach" to the problem of o erseas corporate payments. Foreign Of-
ficials Hearing, supra note 4, at 56-57 (Task Force Letter). The code institutes no en-
forcement mechanism; it simply exhorts firms not to make illegal or improper payments.
The purely hortatory character of the code has led one experienced international ob-
server to describe it as "little more than a pious expression of disapproval." Th ibe
Hearings, supra note 1, at 40 (George Ball, Lehman Brothers).
A more strongly worded statement against questionable overseas pa)ments was unani-
nmously approved nearly a year earlier by the Organization of American States (OAS).
See OAS: Permanent Council Resolution on the Behavior of Transnational Enterprises,
O.A.S. Doe. OEA/Ser. G, CP/RES. 154 (167/75) (July 10, 1975), reprinted in 14 INI'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1326, 1328 (1975).
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Trade (GATT) 4 9 and the United Nations Commission on Transna-
tional Corporations.50
The present complex of United States laws, however, cannot so
easily be discounted as impotent.51 It is appropriate to consider at
length the extent to which existing remedies applicable to domestic
manifestations of the problems of corporate accountability and in-
dustrial concentration can be brought to bear on their overseas coun-
terparts. The conventional wisdom is that even outright bribery of
foreign officials does not violate any American statutes.52 This con-
ventional wisdom, however, merits reexamination.
II. Questionable Payments Abroad: Ensuring
Corporate Accountability
A. The Inadequacy of Public Remedies
Public control over managerial conduct is presently exercised pri-
marily through obligatory disclosure of corporate activities. Certain
federal statutes and regulations require management to supply infor-
49. Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 57 (Task Force Letter). This initiative
uas prompted by S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in Protecting the
.1bititv of the United States to Trade Abroad: Hearings on S. Res. 265 Before the
Stbcomnn. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-6 (1975). The resolution noted the widespread "practices of bribery, indirect
payments, kickbacks, unethical political contributions, and other such similar disrepu-
table activities." Id. at 5. It called on the President's Special Representative fot Trade
Negotiations and other departinental officials to initiate multilateral negotiations for the
purpose of incorporating into GATT "an appropriate code of conduct and specific
trading obligations among governments. . . . including suitable sanctions." Id. at 6.
Prior to the adoption of the resolution, Ford Administration officials dissented from
the congressional view that an agreement among the 102 nations participating in GATI"
would be more effective than the anticipated OECD code of conduct. See, e.g., id. at
1718, 21-22, 29-30 (Frederick Dent, Special Representatihe for Trade Negotiations); id.
at 31-35 (Tra%is Reed, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International
Business). Nesertheless, the resolution passed by a vote of 93-0. Wall St. J., Nov. 13,
1975, at 12, col. 3.
50. Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 57-58 (Task Force Letter). At tihe
second session of the U.N. Commission in March 1976, the United States proposed
negotiation of a treaty on corrupt practices. The proposal was taken up by the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) during its 61st session in July and
August. ECOSOC passed a resolution establishing an ad hoc intergovernmental work
group of member-states from five continents to examine corruption in international
commercial transactions and tos draft an international agreement to eliminate such
corruption. E.S.C. Res. 20-1 (LXI), 61 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. E/RES/2041
(LXI) (1976). The work group is scheduled to report at the 63d ECOSOC session in
mid-1977. UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Aug.-Sept. 1976, at 35, 38-39.
51. This is particularly so if the government commits itself to vigorous enforcement
of all applicable laws. See Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 56 (Task Force
Letter); N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1976, at 53, col. 1 (reporting formation of joint SEC-
Justice Department task force to press criminal charges in corporate bribery cases).
52. See, e.g., CORPORATE IVAThRGATE, supra note 1, at 59; Comment, supra note 15,
at 362, 367.
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mation to governmental agencies. Others mandate the provision of in-
formation to shareholders. The common assumption is that corpo-
rate management will be reluctant to engage in illegal or improper
activities if it must inform the government or shareholders about
those activities.
A number of federal disclosure requirements apply to questionable
corporate payments abroad. The Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID), for example, requires American firms whose sales to
foreign governments are financed by AID loans to report all com-
missions or fees paid.53 Likewise, the Export-Import Bank (Exim-
bank) requires the reporting of any commissions or fees paid by Ameri-
can firms in connection with foreign governmental purchases funded
through Eximbank loans. 5 The Defense Department has similar regu-
lations applicable to foreign military sales.' 5 Firms that file false
statements with these federal agencies may incur criminal penalties.51
If corporations characterize questionable payments as tax-deductible
business expenses, they may run afoul of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). Section 162(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
payments to foreign governmental officials cannot be deducted if such
payments would have violated federal law, had that law been appli-
53. 22 C.F.R. § 201.65(k) (1975).
54. 12 C.F.R. § 401.3(c) (1976).
55. Every Defense Department procurement contract must contain a covenant against
contingent fees, 32 C.F.R. § 1-503 (1975), and every contractor must make written rep-
resentations that it has complied with this prohibition, id. § 1-506.1. Misrepiesentations
in this regard may be penalized, inter alia, through reconsideration of the offending
contractor's eligibility for future bidding or through Justice Department action. Id.
§ 1-508.3.
The covenant, reproduced at id. § 7-103.20, prohibits defense contractors from em-
ploying sales agents on a contingent fee basis to secure governmental business by "im-
proper influence." Id. § 1-505.4(e). "Improper influence" is defined in terms of inducing
unmerited consideration or action by officials of the United States government. Id. § 1-504.
In practice, the Defense Department has employed the same covenant for contractors
for foreign military sales, thereby requiring such contractors to represent that they
have not paid contingent fees to sales agents that have improperly influenced foreign
officials. See MNC Activities Hearings, supra note 6, at 115-16 (colloquy between Rep.
Stephen Solarz and Benjamin Forman, Assistant General Counsel for International
Affairs, Department of Defense).
This de facto approach was given legislative sanction in the International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, [1976] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & An. NEws (90 Stat. 729). The Act provides that contracts for American arms
cannot include a fee or commission that "induces or attempts to induce consideration
or action by any employee or officer of a purchasing foreign government or interna-
tional organization with respect to such purchase on any basis other than such con-
sideration of merit as [is] involved in comparable United States procurements." Id.
§ 604(b).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp.,
368 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1966) (failure to disclose to AID information about improper
payments).
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cable to the transaction.57 Under § 162(c)(2), payments to persons
overseas other than governmental officials are nondeductible if the
taxpayer would be subject to criminal penalties or loss of business
license under state or federal lawY. Although the IRS has not rou-
tinely required taxpayers to furnish information on the payment of
bribes and kickbacks, it has begun an extensive investigation of cor-
porate tax returns for unlawful deductions and related tax violations.50
Of all the governmentally imposed disclosure requirements, only
those of the SEC mandate a direct flow of information to shareholders.
Corporate management has no express statutory obligation to reveal
corporate payments abroad to corporate shareholders. By regulation,
however, the SEC does require the disclosure to investors of all "ma-
terial" information as well as all information whose concealment
would make released information misleading.60 The SEC has taken
the position that improper payments have an important bearing on
the quality of a corporation's earnings.01 Moreover, such payments are
pertinent to "an evaluation of management's stewardship over cor-
porate assets."'3 2 Although payments significant in amount or relating
to a significant amount of business are definitely material, 3 the SEC
has refrained ftom making such significance the touchstone of ma-
teriality. Rather, it has decided to weigh, in each case, "the benefits
of .. .disclosure against its assessment of the extent of investor in-
terest and the cost and utility of the particular disclosure."'6
This ad hoc balancing scheme is not likely to provide an effective
57. The prohibited pa)ments need not be direct. See I.R.C. § 162(c)(1); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.162-18(a)(2) (1976).
58. See generally Note, Federal Income Taxation-Public Policy and the Deductibility
of Kichbachs Under § 162(c)(2), 35 Oino ST. L.J. 686 (1974). The IRS has interpreted
this provision to permit deduction of foreign payments to such individuals where the
payments are made (i) in keeping with locally accepted practice, (ii) with the knowledge
of the recipient's employer, and (iii) without intent to corrupt. MYC Activities Hearings,
supra note 6, at 45 (statement of IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander).
59. See Internal Revenue News Release IR-1590 (Apr. 7, 1976), reprinted in [1976]
9 STAND. FrD. TAx REP. (CCH) 6567; Internal Revenue News Release IR-1574 (Mar.
16, 1976), reprinted in [1976] 9 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) ff 6506; Department of the
Treasury News Release (Feb. 10, 1976), reprinted in [1976] 9 STAND. FED. TAx RE'.
(CCH) ff 6426.
60. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230A08, 240.12b-20, .14a-9 (1976).
61. SEC Report, supra note 7, at 18-19.
62. Id. at 19-20.
63. Id. at 14-15, 29.
64. Id. at 21. This weighing process entails consideration of (i) whether the payment
was made within the corporation's financial accountability system, (ii) the legality of
the pa)ment under local law, (iii) the identity of the recipient, (iv) the amount of
money paid, (v) the extent of management's knowledge or participation, (vi) whether
payments ha e become an integral part of the corporation's operations, and (vii)
whether payments have ceased. Id. at 23-32. Before these official guidelines were ar-
ticulated, similar ones were proposed in Lowenfels, supra note 9, at 28-33.
227
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 215, 1976
weapon against questionable overseas payments. Although neither the
SEC nor the courts are inexperienced at defining "materiality" in
instances of improper corporate payoffs,65 the notion remains too
malleable to anchor guidelines for corporate conductY)I' Moreover, to-
gether, the materiality requirement and the jurisdiction of the SEC
limit considerably the scope of disclosure. The SEC is not authorized
to require disclosure of information important to the public but not
of interest to investors. For example it does not, and arguably can-
not, require disclosure of the names of payment recipients or the
specific purpose of the payments. 1 Nor can it require disclosure by
any corporations that do not issue federally registered securities.08
The focus of SEC law enforcement efforts is simply too narrow to
comprehend the problem of overseas corporate payments 9 The even
narrower scope of the other disclosure regulations discussed above
makes them all the more inadequateY3 These public remedies thus
cannot ensure corporate accountability.
B. The Inadequacy of Private Remedies
The limited scope of public disclosure requirements enhances the
importance of private remedies to ensure corporate accountability.
Yet the primary vehicle for protecting shareholders from managerial
65. See, e.g., SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. Ru'.
(CCH) 1f 95,226 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (failure to disclose in proxy material that officer and
director received kickbacks from firm's domestic transactions held material omission):
Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (failure to disclose in
proxy material that chief executive officer had been convicted of bribery of municipal
officials held material omission); note 9 supra.
66. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 9, at 5-7 (criticizing SEC for straining notion of
materiality in combating corporate payoffs); Note, Foreign Bribes and the Sccuritic%
Acts' Disclosure Requiremets, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1232-38 (1976) (concluding that
materiality is impractical basis for disclosure requirements concerning overseas pa)Imnits).
The actions of certain corporations are cogent evidence of the ambiguity of the ma-
teriality standard. Several firms that lad admitted making extensive qucstionable pay-
muents abroad have told the SEC that they do not consider the payments to be material.
See Solomon & Linville, supra note 7, at 328 n.118. Evidence from shareholder nmeetings
and empirical studies lends support to the corporations' claim that information about
improper pa)ments is not of concern to imcstors. See N.Y. "limes, Oct. 5, 1975,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 19, col. 1, and 101, col. 5 (describing lack of shareholder interest
evinced at annual meetings of United Brands Co. and Exxon Corp.); id., Nov. 12, 1976,
§ D, at 5, col. 1 (SEC study of 75 corporations implicated in questionable paynents
incidents indicates only slight, ephemeral impact on their stock prices).
67. Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 53 (Task Force Letter).
68. This limitation is quite significant. See note 46 supra.
69. "[SEGI disclosure is designed to protect the interests of the prudent investor. It
is, arguably, not an appropriate mechanism to deal with the full array of national con-
cerns caused by thd problem of questionable payments." Foreign Officials Hearing,
sup)a note 4, at 56 (Task Force Letter). See Note, upra note 66, at 1239-42.
70. See Foreign Officials Hearing, supra note 4, at 52 (Task Force Letter); Murphy,
supra note 9, at 482; Solomon & Linville, supra note 7, at 334-35.
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improprieties-the derivative suit-faces major obstacles to its success-
ful employment against managers involved in questionable payments
abroad.
These obstacles exist despite the high fiduciary standards to which
corporate officers and directors are ostensibly held. Officers and di-
rectors are duty-bound to refrain from self-dealing at the expense of
the corporation, 7' to ensure that their activities do not violate the
law or the corporation's charter,7- and to exercise diligently their
supervisory responsibilities to avoid waste of corporate assets.73 Not-
withstanding these seemingly exacting duties, courts usually afford of-
ficers and directors considerable discretion in the management of a
corporation's affairs, so long as they exercise reasonable business judg-
ment in good faith.74
In practice, the business judgment rule tends to insulate manage-
ment from liability to the corporation unless the conduct in question
is clearly wrongful and, moreover, is actually injurious to the cor-
poration. 75 Clear wrongfulness includes violation of the law, 70 con-
travention of public policy,7 7 and self-dealing. 7 8 Actual injury is most
71. E.g., Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1952);
Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 493, 14 N.W.2d 913, 919 (1944). See generally I G.
HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 441 (1959 & Supp. 1968); IV. KNEPI'ER,
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.03, at 7 (2d ed. 1973).
72. E.g., Leppaluoto v. Eggleston, 57 Wash. 2d 393, 402-03, 357 P.2d 725, 731 (1960).
See generally 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF TIlE LAw or PRIVATE CORrOaRTIONS §§ 1021,
1022 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
73. E.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 188 A.2d 125, 130
(1963); Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 609-10, 171 A.2d 381, 395-96 (1961); Lake Harriet
St. Bank v. Vcnie, 138 Minn. 339, 346-47, 165 NA. 225, 228-29 (1917); General Rubber
Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 21, 23, 109 N.E. 96, 97 (1915); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw'
§ 717 (McKinney 1963).
74. "The sound business judgment rule . . . expresses the unanimous decision of
American courts to eschew intervention in corporate decision-naking if the judgment
of directors and officers [is] uninfluenced by personal considerations and is exercised
in good faith." Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974).
See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972) (Colo. law); Burt
v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 852-53, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 407-08 (1965); Cheff v.
Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964); Seder v. Gibbs, 333 Mass. 445,
453, 131 N.E.2d 376, 380 (1956); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
See generally W. KNEPPER, supra note 71, § 1.05, at 11.
75. E.g., Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 763 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974)
("Under New York law, allegation of breach even of a federal statute is apparently
insufficient to state a cause of action unless the breach caused independent damage
to the corporation.") See Harris, Derivative Actions Based Upon Alleged Antitrust Vio-
lations: Trap for the Unwary, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 337, 347-50 (1971). See generally
13 IV. FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 5947 (rev. perm. ed. 1970).
76. E.g., Miller v. American Tel. 9& Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974); Roth
v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 345, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
77. Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 55-56, 74 N.E.2d 305, 306-07 (1947) (closing fac-
tories to intimidate workers).
78. Self-serving disloyalty to the corporation can never be rationalized as a business
judgment. Consequently, the courts do not require derivative suits alleging a breach
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demonstrable where the corporation has suffered a measurable net fi-
nancial loss, though damage to corporate reputation or shareholder
relations may suffice to meet this requirement.79 If both actual injury
and clear wrongfulness are proven, the managers involved may be sub-
ject to claims for damages.80
Alternatively, a court might find that breach of managerial duty
is grounds for injunctive remedy where both clear wrongfulness and
actual injury are established. The recent Third Circuit decision in
Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.sl is suggestive in this
regard. There the court reversed the dismissal of a derivative suit seek-
ing to compel the defendant's directors to collect a $1.5 million debt
owed the corporation by an American political party. The court held
that where the failure to collect the debt allegedly constituted not only
a lack of due diligence but also a campaign contribution in violation
of federal law, a derivative suit could be brought under New York
law.8 2 The unpaid debt itself met the actual injury requirement."
Courts unwilling to award damages or issue an injunction might
allow shareholder remedies in the form of restitution. This remedy
has been employed in cases of self-dealing to recover the corporate
salaries paid to or the profits realized by disloyal officers and direc-
tors.84 Its applicability is not limited to self-dealing, however, as the
old New York Supreme Court decision in Roth v. Robertson" in-
dicates. There the court held that shareholders could force the
corporate manager to account for an illegal payment of $800 made to
ensure the undetected operation of the corporation's amusement park
on Sundays."0 The court explicitly rejected the argument that the
of fiduciary duty by self-dealing to show actual damage to the corporation. Sec, e.g.,
Bailey v. Jacobs; 325 Pa. 187, 194-95, 189 A. 320, 324 (1937). Nevertheless, courts somc-
times do indicate, explicitly or implicitly, that the corporation suffered injury. Compare
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498-99, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81
(1969) (dictum) with Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
79. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d
78, 81-82 (1969) (dictum).
80. E.g., Vilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 1969); Cla)ton
v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 148-49, 153-54, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727, 740, 744-45 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (man-
agement liable for antitrust damages paid by corporation where illegal business arrange-
ment benefiting third party amounted to corporate waste and, thereby, breach of duty).
81. 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
82: Id. at 762-63.
83. Id. at 763.
84. E.g., Anderson Corp. v. Blanch, 340 Mass. 43, 50-51, 162 N.E.2d 825, 830-31
(1959); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 194-95, 189 A. 320, 324 (1937).
85. 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909), cited in Miller v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974).
86. 64 Misc. at 345, 118 N.Y.S. at 353 ("[P]ayments of corporate funds for such
purposes . . . must be condemned, and officers of a corporation making them held
to a strict accountability, and . . .compelled to refund the amounts so wasted for the
benefit of stockholders . ..')
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manager was not liable because he made the payment in the interest
of the corporation.87
The difficulty with relying on Roth and Miller in a derivative suit
arising from questionable corporate payments abroad, however, is
twofold. First, particularly if the payment resulted in a lucrative
procurement contract or a favorable regulatory decree, a court might
be unwilling to find injury to the corporation. Second, even were a
court willing to infer injury to corporate reputation or to hold the
payment itself an injury, it might be unwilling to rule against man-
agement without a demonstration that the payment was illegal under
United States law."5 Significantly, the illegality of the alleged man-
agerial conduct was stressed by both the Miller 9 and the Roth9"
courts. The remainder of this article argues that corporations making
certain overseas payments do violate the antitrust laws. Enforcement
of these laws would thus not only preserve competition but also
facilitate derivative actions against corporate officers and directors
who authorize such payments.
III. Questionable Payments Abroad: Preserving Competition
The applicability of the antitrust laws to the problem of overseas
corporate payments has generally been ignored or discounted. 9' The
recent decisions of the Federal Trade Commission to investigate al-
legedly anticompetitive payments by General Tire and Rubber Com-
pany in Morocco9 2 and by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Europe
and Japan93 suggest that reconsideration of this issue is timely and
worthwhile. Such a reconsideration must examine three possible char-
acterizations of questionable payments abroad: as conspiracies in re-
87. Id.
88. Cf. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 203, 58 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273
(Sup. Ct. 1942), a l'd mere., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944) (derivative suit
dismissed on grounds that managers reasonably could have believed conduct was not
antitrust violation and that they acted in what they believed to be best interests of
corporation).
89. 507 F.2d at 763.
90. 64 Misc. at 345, 118 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
91. See, e.g., MNC Activities Hearings, supra note 6, at 87-95 (statement of Donald
Baker, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, focusing exclusively on
Sherman Act, and stressing problems of sovereign immunity, act of state, foreign gov-
ernmental compulsion, international comity, and substantiality); Foreign Officials Hear-
ing, supra note 4, at 52 (Task Force Letter, asserting that antitrust laws are "generally
inapplicable" and face "substantial constraints" on their "justiciability and enforce-
ability"); Herlihy & Lcinc, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LANw &
POL. INT'L Bus. 547, 604-07 (1976) (concluding that Sherman, Robinson-Patman, and FTC
Acts have "rather narrow application in the area of questionable overseas payments").
92. Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1976, at 4, col. 2.
93. Id., Aug. 24, 1976, at 3, col. 2.
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straint of trade or attempts to monopolize under the Sherman Act, 4
as brokerage fees under the Robinson-Patman Act,1 and as unfair
methods of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act. '",
Before considering in turn the validity of each of these characteriza-
tions, it is important to explore several initial obstacles to the ap-
plication of the antitrust laws to overseas payments.
A. Threshold Considerations: Extraterritoriality
and Governmental Involvement
The two fundamental questions concerning the applicability of the
antitrust laws to overseas payments are (i) whether these laws can reach
anticompetitive conduct abroad and, (ii) if so, whether they can reach
such conduct if foreign governments are involved. Both of these ques-
tions were implicitly raised-and answered negatively-in the land-
mark case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.9 7 In that case
the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint arising from
the defendant's instigation of the Costa Rican government's seizure
of part of the plaintiff's plantation. A high Costa Rican official sub-
sequently obtained title to the property in an irregular ex parte ju-
dicial proceeding and sold it to agents of the defendant. In an opinion
by Justice Holmes, the Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply
to actions occurring outside the United States or involving sovereign
acts that were lawful in the country in which they were performed. '"x
American Banana's holding against overseas application of the Sher-
man Act has been gradually chipped away, 99 and the extension of the
major antitrust statutes to overseas conduct is now firmly estab-
lished.100 The jurisdictional issue of extraterritoriality in a given case
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. V 1975).
95. Id. § 13(c) (1970).
96. Id. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
97. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See generally IV. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE tNl Tin: ANIt-
TRUST LAWS § 2.7 (2d ed. 1973).
98. 213 U.S. at 357-59. For a fascinating critique of the Holmes opinion, see J.
NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF utE LAW 107-10 (1976).
99. The erosion can be traced in United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106, 134 (1911); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87,
105-06 (1913); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917); United States v. Sisal Sale-
Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319,
327-28 (1947); Tiinken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1951);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide , Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962).
100. See note 99 supra (Sherman Act §§ 1, 2); Ba)soy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F.
Supp. 303, 305 (W.D. Pa. 1950) (Robinson-Patman Act § 2(c)); Branch v. EzTC, 141 F.2d
31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944) (FTC Act § 5).
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now turns on whether the conduct has substantial effect on American
commerce at home or abroad.' 01
Whether 'conduct abroad is held to affect United States commerce
may depend, in part, on whether the defendant is an American citi-
zen. Where foreign nationals alone are involved, courts may be re-
luctant to take jurisdiction in the absence of a showing that the con-
duct in question had a deliberate and substantial effect on United
States foreign or domestic commerce. 102 'Where an American citizen
is involved, in contrast, courts are more likely to assert jurisdiction
and consider the effect of the citizen's conduct on United States com-
merce as a question going to the merits of the antitrust claim.' 0 3 On
the merits, the substantiality requirement may vary, depending on the
statutory basis for the complaint. 0
Although American Banana's ban on overseas application of the
antitrust laws has been effectively overruled, the case lives on through
its implicit holding that anticompetitive conduct involving foreign
governments does not give rise to antitrust liability.1 5 Application
of this aspect of American Banana to overseas payments is likely to
depend on judicial analysis of the act of state doctrine and, in rare
instances, of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. These doctrines
implicate two interrelated questions: the extent to which a govern-
ment official's conduct is a sovereign act and the extent to which the
court's intervention in the matter would cause friction between the
United States and the foreign state or between the judicial and execu-
tive branches of government.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields a sovereign state from
"the exercise by another state of jurisdiction to enforce rules of
law." 1111 Available only to a defendant foreign government or its
agents, the doctrine would seem to have little applicability to litigation
101. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 647 (2d Cir.),
cert, denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956). See generally W. FUCATE, supra note 97, § 2.1 at
30, § 2.8.
102. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir.
1945) (L. Hand, J.).
103. See Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 817
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 35
(7th Cir. 1944). See generally W. FUGTE, supra note 97, §§ 2.8, .9, .20.
104. Whether certain conduct affects American foreign commerce is a substantive as
well as a jurisdictional issue. Once it is determined that the conduct has sufficient
connection with the United States to support federal jurisdiction, a court must then con-
sider whether the conduct is sufficiently anticompetitive to come within the prohibition
of the statute on which the prosecution or complaint is based. See pp. 241-42, 248-49
in ra.
105. See, e.g., notes 121, 125-26 infi'a (citing cases); IV. FUCATE, supra note 97, § 2.21.
106. ,RtSrATEMNENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIoNs LAw § 65 (1965).
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over payments abroad. Indeed, foreign governments would more like-
ly be plaintiffs in such actions than defendants. 0 7
Even were a foreign government the object of a payments suit, the
sovereign immunity doctrine might not be applied. Generally both
the State Department and the courts have restricted the doctrine's pro-
tection to noncommercial acts of foreign states.'9 5 Therefore, many
instances of overseas payments to obtain governmental contracts or
concessions would seem to fall outside the protective scope of sovereign
immunity. 0 9 The restrictive view of the doctrine, however, has so far
been taken only in cases in which state-owned or state-operated com-
mercial ventures were defendants."10 Thus, one can only speculate
whether the restriction would be deemed pertinent in cases in which
governments or their officials were defending acts involving improper
receipts of payments."' Since most overseas payments suits are likely
107. Cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,892 (8th Cir.
1976) (granting foreign government standing to bring treble damage antitrust action
against American corporations). This case is discussed at pp. 252-53 infra.
108. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1863-66
(1976) (dictum); letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Robert
Bork, Solicitor General (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in id. at 1867-69. Although the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity has long been recognized by federal courts, see The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), the restrictihe view of the doctrine
is a more recent development. See letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Adiiser. l)e-
partment of State, to Philip Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), retinted
in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952); National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S.
356, 361 (1955) (relying on Tate letter).
Notwithstanding its general policy, the State Department has suggested that courts
grant sovereign immunity in certain cases where the dispute arguably iniolcd com-
mercial acts. The courts have invariably deferred to the Department's suggestion in these
cases. See, e.g., Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belogorsk, 493 F.2d 1223
(1st Cir. 1974). Since Congress recently wrote the restrictihe ' iew of solereign immunity
into statutory law and stressed that claims for such immunity should be determined bv
the courts, deference to the State Department may diminish. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602
(West Dec. 1976 Pamphlet).
109. A close question might arise where the payments were made to influence inili-
tary procurement decisions, since the transaction, though commercial, would stem from
the sovereign state's need to support its armed forces. Compare Aerotrade, Inc. v.
Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (sovereign immunity bars recovely
against government purchaser for money owed on contract for sale of military equip-
ient) with Rovin Sales Co. v. Socialist Republic of Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302
(N.D. 11. 1975) (sovereign immunity does not bar recovery against government for
breach of wine distributorship contract). The new congressional guidelines, ushich state
that the "nature" of the transaction, not its "purpose," is dispositihe, do not unambigu-
ously resolve this question. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(d) (West Dec. 1976 Pamphlet).
110. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1865
(1976) (citing cases).
111. Conceivably, courts might be reluctant to find an exception to sovereign im-
munity where the acts involved were improper, because judicial resolution of the
dispute might embarrass the foreign government. Cf. Heaney v. Government of Spain,
445 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1971) (immunity granted, absent suggestion by State De-
partment, in action based on defendant government's alleged contract with plaintiff to
agitate against another government; court held that contract was potentially embarrassing
political activity and rejected plaintiff's argument that impropriety of contract made
it unfit for doctrine's protection).
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to be brought against corporations, however, even an expansive view
of the sovereign immunity doctrine would not pose a major obstacle
to antitrust action against overseas payments.
In contrast, the broader act of state doctrine is likely to be raised
in virtually every case of overseas payments. The core of this doctrine,
which predates American Banana, is that "the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory." 112 A "principle of decision . . . com-
pelled by neither international law nor the Constitution,""' the act
of state doctrine derives from the prudential judgment that judicial
inquiry into the legitimacy or propriety of foreign governmental acts
might generate international friction and impair the diplomatic func-
tion of the executive branch."' Thus, the doctrine may apply to any
alleged governmental action, whether or not it was tantamount to
compulsion,"15 and whether or not the governmental actor is a party
to the lawsuit." 6 Of course, if the foreign government itself brings
the action, the act of state doctrine is an untenable defense, for the
government in effect is calling for judicial inquiry. The analysis that
follows focuses on the use of the act of state defense where the foreign
government is not the plaintiff.
Although a court might interpret the act of state doctrine to pre-
clude any consideration of a foreign official's conduct,117 this approach
seems to invoke the doctrine prematurely. The act of state doctrine
is not an appropriate defense in every case involving foreign gov-
ernmental conduct. Initial analysis of the character of that involvement
should precede a judicial determination that the act of state doctrine
applies." 8
Such analysis should ordinarily focus on the forcefulness and for-
mality of the foreign government's involvement." 0 Under certain cir-
112. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
113. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).
114. Id. at 423-24, 427-28. Since Sabbatino the Supreme Court has had difficulty
applying the doctrine. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct.
1854 (1976); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional dc Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
115. See Calvani, Book Review, 74 MicH. L. REv. 164, 169-74 (1975).
116. See, e.g., notes 125-26 infra (citing cases).
117. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291,
1298-99 (D. Del. 1970).
118. Cf. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286, 1294 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (in determining relevance
ot Paikur v. BMown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942), in domestic antitrust action, proposition that
there was state involvement "only begins the analysis, for it is not every governmental
act that points a path to an antitrust shelter").
119. See W. Frt, xTe, supra note 97, § 2.21, at 76 (arguing that anticompetitive con-
duct should be shielded only if required by foreign law or directed by foreign executive
authority).
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cumstances a corporation's defense may merge the act of state doctrine
with the governmental compulsion doctrine, which has developed in-
dependently but is an aspect of the broader theory. Known in its
domestic context as the Parker v. Brown doctrine,'2  this defense as-
serts that a private party does not violate the antitrust laws by per-
forming acts required of it by a sovereign state.1 21 In defending against
an antitrust suit arising from an overseas payment, a corporation might
invoke the governmental compulsion defense by claiming that its pay-
ment had been extorted by the foreign government. A court's ruling
on this issue would depend largely on its assessment of the degree
of governmental compulsion that the doctrine presumes.
A strict test for governmental compulsion gains support from the
progressive limitation of the Parker v. Brown doctrine in domestic
cases. Recently the Supreme Court has held the doctrine inapplicable
to anticompetitive conduct " 'prompted' " by state action 1'2' and to
anticompetitive conduct that could not be terminated without state
permission but that could have been avoided in the first instance by
the defendant. 12 3 These holdings suggest that in the foreign context
courts should permit only a narrow governmental compulsion defense.
The defendant should carry the burden of proving that its conduct
was compelled and that the compulsion derived from the government
itself.
The less forceful the governmental involvement, the more courts
should insist that the alleged act of state be formal rather than casual.
International comity and separation of powers, the underpinnings
of the act of state doctrine, 24 argue for applying it only where the
alternative is judicial evaluation of the validity of an exercise of public
authority-a judicial ruling, a legislative enactment, a regulatory de-
cree, or an executive use of police powers. Thus, nationalization of
120. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942). See generally Handler, The Gurrent
Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
121. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291,
1296-99 (D. Del. 1970); Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in
United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 132-40, 142-44 (1967)..
122. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) ("It is not enough that
• . . anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive ac-
tivities must be compelled by direction of the state acting as a sovereign.")
123. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3119 (1976) ("[Defendant'sl par.
ticipation in the decision [to engage in the anticompetitive conduct] is sufficiently sig-
nificant to require that its conduct implementing the decision . . . conform to ap-
plicable federal law.")
124. The Sabbatino Court refers explicitly to separation of powers and implicitly
to international comity. 376 U.S. at 423-24, 427-28.
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property 25 and assertion of territorial claimsaG are properly beyond
the scope of judicial inquiry. Where no such formal governmental acts
are in question, however, the local legality and authoritativeness of
an official's conduct should be considered in deciding whether that
conduct was an act of state.' - Since acceptance of corporate payments
seems to violate foreign laws1 - s and, judging from the recent reactions
of foreign governments, 29 to overstep the limits of official authority,
it would be inappropriate to invoke the act of state doctrine to protect
corporations that induce such conduct by government officials.
Quite apart from the sovereign character of an official's conduct,
the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,130 suggests that the act of state doctrine,
like the doctrine of sovereign immunity, simply may not apply to pri-
vate or commercial acts of sovereign states.131 Wether this view ul-
timately prevails or not, the distinction between public and private
acts may nevertheless serve in conjunction with the formality and
forcefulness of official conduct in determining whether to classify
the conduct as an act of state. This distinction militates against classi-
fying acceptance or solicitation of corporate payments as an act of
state where those payments are made in connection with a govern-
ment's proprietary decisions.
Additional arguments for not applying the act of state doctrine
to payments made to foreign officials are suggested by the Supreme
Court's decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,132. a case
that arose from Cuba's expropriation of American property. In
Sabbatino the Court stated that the act of state doctrine is principally
concerned with "the proper distribution of functions between the
judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing
upon foreign affairs."' 33 The Court observed that "the greater the
125. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10, 23-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
126. See, e.g., Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 396 F.
Supp. 461, 468-70 (W.D. La. 1975); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil
Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108-11 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
127. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07
(1962) (corporate defendant's subsidiary, though an agent of foreign government, was
acting on its own without official approval and therefore did not afford defendant a
defense).
128. See note 17 supra.
129. See note 2 supra.
130. 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
131. Id. at 1861-67 (this part of the Court's opinion, written by Mr. Justice White,
was joined only by the Chief Justice, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist).
132. 376 U.S. 598 (1964).
133. Id. at 427-28.
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degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to ren-
der decisions regarding it."'13 Its decision to apply the act of state
doctrine in Sabbatino was based in part on the absence of settled
international law standards governing expropriation of aliens' prop-
erty.' -  Furthermore, the Court sensed that judicial intervention in
the dispute over expropriated property might cause resentment among
foreign states and friction with or embarrassment of the executive
branch.130
The concerns expressed in Sabbatino seem inapposite to cases of
overseas payments. Traditional sources of international law manifest
a broad consensus against bribery of government officials. Not only
have international organizations recorded their opposition,"T but
virtually every sovereign state has legally proscribed such practices.' 38
Resentment abroad and embarrassment at home are likely to accrue
only if United States courts refuse to intervene. Foreign states may
actually welcome American efforts-even judicial efforts-to control
the conduct of American corporations abroad.139 By the same token,
the executive branch might well be embarrassed if its explicit position
against overseas payments were judicially undermined in the eyes of
foreign governments and American corporations.' 40 This would seem
particularly likely where payments were made without governmental
compulsion, for it is in such circumstances that diplomacy has little
to offer.' 4 '
If the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state are held in-
applicable to cases of overseas corporate payments, the effectiveness
of the antitrust laws in protecting American competitors abroad will
depend on judicial willingness to find that such payments fall within
one or another statutory prohibition. The following three sections
134. Id. at 428.
135. Id. at 428-30.
136. Id. at 431-33.
137. See note 48 supra. Other international organizations are presently at work to
the same end. See notes 49-50 supra.
138. See note 17 supra.
139. Cf. SEN. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976) (quoting Attorney General
of Botswana: "Certainly, no self-respecting African nation would consider U.S. legislation
aimed at curbing corrupt practices of American transnational enterprises in their foreign
host states to be 'presumptuous' or in any way 'an interference'.")
140. Cf. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinfeld, J.:
"It may well be that recent public disclosure of the dealings of multi-national cor-
porations with foreign governments which have an adverse impact upon American in-
terests justifies a reappraisal of the act of state doctrine to determine whether its scope
should be confined.")
141. See pp. 221-22 supra.
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consider whether the prohibitions of the Sherman, Robinson-Patman,
and Federal Trade Commission Acts include questionable corporate
payments abroad.
B. Overseas Payments as Conspiracies in Restraint
of Trade or Attempts to Monopolize
Sections one and two of the Sherman Act1 42 have long been con-
strued as a broad prohibition of anticompetitive corporate conduct, 
43
extending to acts occurring abroad that affect the foreign or domestic
commerce of the United States. 14 Both the spirit and the letter of
these provisions argue in favor of their application to corporations
that make overseas payments to gain advantage over their American
competitors in foreign markets. An examination of the pertinent case
law supports this view.
If the doctrinal defenses discussed in the preceding section were
held inapplicable, the courts would probably consider overseas pay-
ments as analogous to other anticompetitive efforts to influence gov-
ernmental acts. Some such efforts have been held unlawful under the
Sherman Act,la5 particularly where they have been directed at ob-
taining governmental contracts'40 or manipulating existing regula-
112. Section 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975), provides: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... ."
Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975), prol ides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
143. The breadth of the provisions' scope was stressed in the early judicial con-
structions of the Act. In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181
(1911), the Supreme Court, citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911),
declared: "[T]he generic designation of the first and second sections of the law, when
taken together, embraced every conceivable act which could possibly come within the
spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law, without regard to the garb in which
such acts were clothed." The Court subsequently attributed to the Sherman Act "a
generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
144. See p. 232 & note 99 supra.
145. "The policies of the Sherman Act should not be sacrificed simply because de-
fendants employ governmental processes to accomplish anti-competitive purposes." Woods
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1296 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (filing of false "nomination forecasts" with state
commission so as to reduce plaintiffs' production allowables). See, e.g., Sacramento Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 826 (1971) (unions illegally coerced state official to issue directive forbidding
sale of plaintiffs' product at state fair).
146. E.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25,
32-33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (allegations that pool equipment sup-
plier's sales tactics were effort to distort state and local governments' competitive bidding
process stated cause of action).
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tions.147 Domestic lobbying for or against the enactment of legislation
or the promulgation of regulations, however, has enjoyed the pro-
tection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 14 This doctrine was de-
veloped in the context of domestic lobbying efforts by trade associa-
tions, companies, and labor unions. To safeguard First Amendment
rights of petition and to preserve representative democracy in the
United States, the doctrine gives corporations and other interest groups
considerable latitude to try to influence their government's officials,
so long as the effort is not a mere sham to cover attempted interference
with a competitor's business a4 9
On two grounds, this doctrine should not be considered applicable
to cases of overseas payments. First, making payments is not a legiti-
mate means of influencing government officials. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has indicated that bribery comes under the sham exception
to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 15 0 Second, given the constitutional
underpinnings of the doctrine, its protection extends only to activities
within the United States.' 5 ' Corporations have no First Amendment
right of petition overseas and the strength of representative democracy
in America does not depend on corporate lobbying abroad. 52 There-
147. E.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511-13
(1972) (allegations that large trucking firms instituted state and federal proceedings to
defeat operating rights applications of smaller competitors stated cause of action); Israel
v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (allegations that com-
petitors precluded fair FDA consideration of plaintiff's drug applications stated cause
of action); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286, 1292-98 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (filing of false "nomination
forecasts" with state commission so as to reduce plaintiffs' production allowables Niolatcd
Act).
148. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965); Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-38 (1961).
149. See note 148 supra (citing cases).
150. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
Trucking Unlimited renders doubtful the precedential Nalue of a line of earlier cases
holding that a corporation's bribery or other imploper influence of a government official
does not give a competitor a cause of action under the Sherman Act. See Non ille v.
Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 303 F.2d 281, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1962); Parmelee Transp. Co. v.
Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804-05 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961); Sterling Nelson
& Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Idaho 1964), aff'd on other grounds,
351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). But cf. Calnetics Corp. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 687-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 355
(1976). The Calnetics court held that "commercial bribery, standing alone" does not
violate the Sherman Act. Although the case did not involve governmental action, the
court cited the district court opinion in Rangen as its chief support. It also referred to
Norville, a Clayton Act case, and United States v. Boston & M.R.R., 380 U.S. 157 (1965),
another Clayton Act case. In citing Boston on this point the Ninth Circuit was less
perceptive than it had been 11 years earlier. See note 178 infra.
151. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 270 (1901) (Constitution inapplicable to
foreign states); The "City of Panama," 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879) (Constitution is co-
extensive with political jurisdiction of U.S.).
152. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108
(C.D. Cal. 1971), afl'd per curiarn on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
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fore, payments abroad, whether to sway a certain procurement deci-
sion or to elicit favorable legislative or executive policies, should be
cognizable under the Sherman Act.
In establishing the elements of a § 1 or § 2 offense, two problems
might arise. First, to prove a § 1 violation the plaintiff or prosecutor
would have to demonstrate the existence of an anticompetitive con-
spiracy. 153 If the defendant corporation had colluded with other firms
to make payments in restraint of trade, the conduct clearly would
be prohibited under a line of cases applying the Sherman Act to multi-
corporate transnational conspiracies advanced by the procurement of
favorable governmental action. 154 A payment agreement between a
single corporation and a government official is no less a conspiracy
and, in the absence of countervailing act of state considerations, it
should be treated as such.'1
A more troublesome problem in establishing the elements of a § 1
or § 2 offense is the need to demonstrate the requisite effect on com-
merce. Beyond the effect required for United States courts to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction, 150 sufficient effect must be shown to sub-
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Comment, Corporate Lobbyists Abroad: The Extraterritorial
Application of Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity, 61 CALir. L. REV. 1254, 1277
(1973) (concluding that "none of the rationales behind the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
[is] directly applicable to foreign petitioning," though diplomatic considerations may
argue in favor of its extension). But see P. AREEDA, ANTITRusT ANALYSIS f1 192, at 130
(1974) (asserting that doctrine applies to petitioning of foreign democracies).
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
154. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
704-07 (1962); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 273-74 (1927).
The Continental Ore decision also supports the proposition that subsidiaries can be
coconspirators. One of the corporate defendants was held not immune from the Sherman
Act, though it was a subsidiary of another of the defendants. Courts have generally
been reluctant to accept the argument that subsidiaries should not be liable for § 1
violations because they are not separate corporations. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Tinken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F.
Stipp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See generally IV. FUGATE, supra note 97, §§ 10.2-A.
155. Government officials have been among the alleged conspirators in several comi-
plaints found cognizable under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521
F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Where the complaint goes beyond mere allegations of
official persuasion by anticompetitive lobbying and claims official participation with
private individuals in a scheme to restrain trade, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is
inapplicable."); Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964). After the Supreme Court
rulings in Noerr and Pennington, but before that in Trucking Unlimited, the Ninth
Circuit questioned whether Harman correctly applied the Sherman Act to a conspiracy
between a corporation and a governmental official. Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver
State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1969). The Pennington opinion cited
in Sun Valley does not support the view that a corporation and a governmental official
cannot constitute a § 1 conspiracy. Indeed, in Pennington the Court expressly noted
that no governmental official was claimed to be a coconspirator. See id. at 344 (Browning,
J., concurring in part) (citing Pennington).
156. See pp. 232-33 supra.
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stantiate a Sherman Act violation.l 57 Unfortunately, the case law does
not provide clear guidance as to what constitutes a sufficient effect.
The search for standards is complicated by the failure in some cases
to distinguish between the effect necessary to establish jurisdiction
and that required to establish a violation.1 3s Cases holding that
allegations have stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act have
invariably involved quite substantial restraints on United States
foreign commerce.159 The head of the Antitrust Division has con-
cluded that the "substantial effect" requirement of the Sherman Act
may be a significant impediment to successful prosecution of firms
that make overseas payments.' 60
Thus, though the Sherman Act may be a potent statutory weapon
against major anticompetitive payment practices abroad,' 6 ' other an-
titrust laws may be needed to reach payments with lesser anticom-
petitive effects. The Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission
157. Though substantiality of effect is not generally considered an element of a
domestic § I offense, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26
n.59 (1940), this distinction between § 1 and § 2 does not seem to be drawn in dis-
cussions of the antitrust laws and American foreign commerce. See, e.g., notes 158-60
infra (citing sources). The distinctions imposed by the statutory language, however, re-
main. Section 1 is directed at multiparty offenses; proof of a conspiracy to restrain trade
is essential to establish a § I violation. Section 2 is directed at market domination; it
requires a demonstration that the defendant attempted to obtain monopoly power in a
definable geographical and product market.
158. See Beausang, The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 DicK. L.
REv. 187, 191-93 (1966); Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the American Antitrust
Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523 (1974). Compare Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes
Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), a!f'd per curiam on other
grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) (noting confusion
in case law and suggesting that substantial anticompetitive effect is criterion for vio-
lation, not jurisdiction) with United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822
(N.D. Cal. 1957) ("direct and substantial" effect necessary for jurisdiction) and United
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. j 70,600
at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. j 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("sub-
stantial and material" effect necessary for jurisdiction).
159. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962) (monopolization of exports of ferrovanadium and vanadium oxide to Canada);
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (monopolization of imports of
sisal from Mexico).
160. See MNC Activities Hearings, supra note 6, at 91 (statement oc Donald Baker,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division). See generally R'oRT OF AT-
TORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUsT LAws 76 (Gov. Printing
Off. 1955) ("[T]he Sherman Act applies only to those arrangements between Americans
alone, or in concert with foreign firms, which have such substantial anticompetithe
effects on this country's 'trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations' as to constitute
unreasonable restraints. . . . [C]onspiracies between foreign competitors alone should
come within the Sherman Act only where they are intended to, and actually do, result
in substantial anticompetitive effects on our foreign commerce.")
161. To establish a Sherman Act violation it might be necessary to prove allegations
as substantial as those made in the FTC complaint filed against General Tire and Rubber
Company for making payments to prevent competitors from entering the Moroccan
market. See Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1976, at 4, col. 2.
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Act, both originally passed to supplement the Sherman Act, are worth
examining in this regard.
C. Overseas Payments as Brokerage Fees
Under certain circumstances, the limitations of the Sherman Act
can be overcome by considering overseas payments under § 2(c) of
the Clayton Act.1'G The language of § 2(c) broadly prohibits the pay-
ments of brokerage fees to persons under the direct or indirect con-
trol of another party to a sale-of-goods transaction. 163 Thus, the pro-
vision may be applicable where overseas payments are made through
intermediaries such as sales agents, brokers, or "consultants" to gain
governmental procurement contracts.0 4
Section 2(c) was enacted specifically to outlaw arrangements where-
by buyers exacted price concessions disguised as brokerage commis-
sions to their agents or to themselves.165 Thus, like other parts of
the Robinson-Patman Act amendments to the Clayton Act, § 2(c) was
intended to combat price discrimination. In addition, however, the
provision reflected congressional concern that false brokerage agree-
ments undermined confidence in brokers generally, thereby impair-
ing their important role as a market mechanism.160
Since the purpose of the provision was not to discourage the pay-
162. Section 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a com-
mission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of
goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an
agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is
acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of
any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is
so granted or paid.
163. The sale-of-goods focus of § 2(c) was recently stressed in a holding that the
provision does not apply to bribes unrelated to sales transactions. Rodman v. Haines, 5
TR,%E REG. REP. (CCH) (1976-2 Trade Cas.) f 61,074 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
164. For examples of this common practice, see note 14 supra.
165. Enactment of § 2(c) was a response to an investigation of chain stores by the
FTC that revealed that large chain buyers were obtaining indirect price concessions by
creating dummy brokers whose "fee" the buyer forced the seller to pay. But this was not
the only trade practice intended to be reached by § 2(c). For example, Representative
Wright Patman explained on the floor of the House:
A practice has grown up whereby large mass buyers bribe representatives of the
seller ... under the guise of a brokerage allowance. It is not a brokerage allowance
at all; it is a bribe. [Section 2(c)] will not compel the use of a broker but it will
prohibit one party from bribing the representative of the other under the guise
of brokerage allowances or commissions.
80 CoNC. REc. 7759-60 (1936) (emphasis added).
166. See id. at 8112; S. R P. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1936); H.R. REP. No.
2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1936).
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ment of legitimate commissions for services rendered but rather to
eliminate sham brokerage, § 2(c) expressly excepts from its prohibi-
tion fees paid for "services rendered."' 67 Recognizing that this ex-
ception might nullify the prohibition, courts quickly limited the
exception by holding that one party's representative is inherently
incapable of rendering services to the other in a manner contem-
plated by the statute.' 68 Shorn of this exception, § 2(c) constitutes an
absolute prohibition of false brokerage agreements, whether made by
seller or buyer. In contrast to § 2(a), 160 for example, the language of
§ 2(c) does not require that liability be based on a showing of price
discrimination or anticompetitive effect.7 0 By the same token, the
language does not allow liability to be avoided by arguing that the
fee was justified by costs or that it simply met the competition's fees. 7'
The Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.,'" '
though best known for its dicta suggesting that across-the-board re-
ductions of commissions on large sales might be permissible under
§ 2(c),1 73 actually reaffirmed the provision's unqualified ban on sham
brokerage. The Court indicated that there could be no cost justifica-
tion for paying unearned brokerage and that the "services rendered"
exception would not shield payments to another's broker unless the
broker's services were in the interest of its principal.' 7 4 In a footnote
the Court expressly stated that § 2(c) prohibits certain forms of com-
mercial bribery. 75
Thus, the thrust of the Broch Court's opinion lends support to a
line of lower court cases in which private parties have successfully
sued to recover treble damages for injuries incurred from the pay-
167. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970).
168. Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
638 (1940); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 673-75 (3d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940). See F. RowE, Pluce DISCRIMINATION UNDLR TIlE RoBMON.-
PATMAN Acr 350 (1962).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
170. See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 671, 696 (9th
Cir), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 355 (1976); F. RowE, supra note 168, at 331.
171. See FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 43-14 (9th Cir. 1959); F.
RowE, supra note 168, at 337.
172. 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
173. Id. at 176. The actual holding of the Court was that § 2(c) had been violated
when Broch, a brokerage firm for a number of sellers, agreed to reduce its standard
commission on sales to one customer so that a seller could offer the customer a lower
price. Such an agreement, the Court found, had the same effect as making payments
directly to the buyer. id. at 174-75.
174. Id. at 173-74. See Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir. 1976)
("services rendered" defense inapplicable where an agent violates his fiduciary duty to
his principal).
175. 363 U.S. at 169-70 n.6.
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ment of bribes disguised as brokerage fees.' 76 Of these cases, the one
most suggestive of the applicability of § 2(c) to overseas payments is
Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons.1'7 7 In that case, the Ninth
Circuit held that a fish food producer could recover treble damages
from a competitor and from a state official whom the competitor had
bribed in order to obtain contracts to supply fish food to the state.'75
Citing Broch and other cases, the Rangen court rejected the defendants'
argument that § 2(c) applies only where a brokerage commission con-
stitutes price discrimination.7 9 The court noted that both Congress
at the time of enactment and the Supreme Court in Broch had recog-
nized the provision's coverage of commercial bribery. 80 The court
held that the "services rendered" exception did not include "services
performed by a buyer's agent for the seller but against the interest
of the buyer."' 81 Finally, the court concluded that although the pay-
ments involved must be made to a party to the transaction or to
someone connected with that party in an agency, representative, or
intermediary relationship, a state employee having no official respon-
sibility for the state's procurement policies who nevertheless did in-
fluence the state's purchasing decisions could be regarded as an inter-
mediary within the meaning of § 2(c).ls2
Nothing in the language of § 2(c) limits the Rangen holding to
domestic bribery. Unlike § 2(a), § 2(c) is not by its terms limited to
transactions involving commodities sold for "use, consumption, or re-
sale within the United States." Since the Clayton Act defines "'com-
merce" as "trade or commerce among the several States and with
176. See, e.g., Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976); Fitch v. Kentucky-
Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943) (upholding treble damage
award of o~er .$100,000). Both these cases involved suits by corporations that had made
purchases after one of their officers received a payment from the seller. This suggests
that foreign governments might be able to bring § 2(c) suits against firms that obtained
procurement contracts by bribing go'ernment officials. Cf. pp. 252-53 infra (Indian gov-
erinent successfully asserted standing to bring Sherman Act suit).
177. 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
178. The court correctly discounted the relevance of a Supreme Court statement
relied on by the Rangen defendants but made in a totally different context. In United
States v. Boston & M.R.R., 380 U.S. 157, 162 (1965) (quoted in 351 F.2d at 857), the
Court had asserted that bribery is "remote from an antitrust frame of reference." The
Boston Court had simply denied that receipt of kickbacks by railroad directors gave
them a "substantial interest" in the railroad's supplier under the Clayton Act's conflict-
of-interest prohibition, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1964) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1970)).
179. 351 F.2d at 856-58.
180. Id. at 856-57.
181. Id. at 859.
182. Id. at 862. The Supreme Court has cited Rangen for the proposition that bribery
of a public official may constitute a violation of § 2(c). California Motor Transp. Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
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foreign nations,"''1 3 the Robinson-Patman Act, as an amendment to
the Clayton Act, reaches both interstate and international business
transactions. 84 Although the international implications of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act were once described as dormant, 85 two district court
cases suggest how easily the recent disclosures of overseas payments
could activate these implications of § 2(c).
In Baysoy v. Jessup Steel Co.,186 a citizen of Turkey sought damages
for an alleged breach of a contract in which the defendant, an Ameri-
can corporation, had agreed, upon completion of a sale to the plaintiff
of a quantity of ferrochrome, to pay the plaintiff a percentage of the
purchase price as commission. The court, in granting the defendant's
motion to dismiss, held that even assuming the contract could be said
to contemplate an export sale, § 2(c) applied and barred enforcement
of the brokerage fee contract.187 In support of its holding the court
noted the Clayton Act's definition of commerce. 88 It also cited Rep-
resentative Patman's opinion that to determine the limit and scope
of the clauses other than § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, it is
necessary to turn to the definition of commerce found in the Clayton
Act.189 The court concluded that the plaintiff's brokerage fee did not
fall within the "services rendered" exception because none of the
services alleged were rendered to the seller. Rather, all services ren-
dered were for the buyer's own benefit. 9
Subsequently, in Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman &¢
Sons,' 91 a foreign company sued its chief buyer and an American cor-
poration for allegedly conspiring to extract exorbitant prices from
the plaintiff under the guise of arm's length bargaining. The court
held that the commercial bribery alleged by the plaintiff was within
the proscription of § 2(c).' 9 2 The court further held, citing Baysoy,
that § 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act applies to export sales. 193
One commentator, writing before Canadian Ingersoll-Rand, specu-
lated that Baysoy would prove "aberrational."'' 94 Since Congress had
183. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970), as amended by Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-435, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (90 Stat. 1394).
184. The key exception to the Robinson-Patman Act's extraterritoriality is § 2(a).
See p. 245 supra.
185. F. RowE, supra note 168, at 81.
186. 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
187. Id. at 305-06.
188. Id. at 305.
189. Id. at 305-06.
190. Id. at 306-07.
191. 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
192. Id. at 833.
193. Id. at 833-34.
194. F. RowE, supra note 168, at 82.
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not intended the Robinson-Patman Act to preclude American firms
from making discriminatory export sales, the commentator contended,
future cases might construe the jurisdictional elements of § 2(c) in
pari materia with those of § 2(a), thereby excluding export transac-
tions.195 The decision in Canadian Ingersoll-Rand, however, suggests
that the revelations of questionable brokerage commissions abroad
may make Baysoy not aberrational but precedential. Indeed, as the
next section indicates, to the extent that false brokerage commissions
are considered an unfair method of competition, § 2(c) should be
read in pari materia with the Federal Trade Commission Act, whose
extraterritorial scope is expressly established.
D. Overseas Payments as Unfair Methods of Competition
Courts consistently have held that the Federal Trade Commission
Act and the Clayton Act are to be read in pari materia.190 Any vio-
lation of the Clayton Act is also a violition of § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,1 97 which declares unfair methods of com-
petition to be unlawful. 9s Thus, payment of false brokerage may
be the basis for liability not only under § 2(c) of the Clayton Act
but also under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Moreover,
the expansive scope of § 5199 may make it possible to reach overseas
payments whether or not they were made in the form of brokerage
fees and whether or not they were made in the context of a sale-of-
goods transaction. Significantly, the FTC already expressly proscribes
commercial bribery in various industries as an unfair trade practice. 200
The FTC's jurisdiction over unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce has been specifically extended by § 4 of the Webb-
195. Id. In arguing that overseas discrimination is beyond the reach of § 2(c), Rowe
had in mind "dumping"--not overseas payments.
196. See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 770 (6th Cir. 1966);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 344 F.2d 599, 605 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939 (1965);
FTC v. Reed, 243 F.2d 308, 309 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957); Menzies v.
FTC, 242 F.2d 81, 83 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 957 (1957).
197. See, e.g., American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 824 (1962) (Clayton Act § 2(d)); United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 285 F.2d
607, 610 n.4 (2d Cir. 1960), a!f'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 208 (1961) ("any violation of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts").
198. Section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975), provides: "Unfair methods of com-
petition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or af-
fecting commerce, are declared unlawful."
199. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972) (opinion
joined by all seven participating Justices holding that § 5 reaches even those unfair
practices that do not infringe the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws and do not
affect competition).
200. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§ 143.8, 144.14, 146.16, 147.12 (1976).
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Pomerene (Export Trade) Act 0' 1 to include conduct outside the United
States. Although the purpose of the Webb-Pomerene Act as a whole
was to permit combinations of American companies to engage in ex-
port trade,2 02 its effect has been quite restrictive. As one commen-
tator has observed, the Act is "an anomalous statute which exempts
export associations from the Sherman Act upon such strict conditions
that the Sherman Act appears to be actually reinforced with additional
prohibitions."2 0 3
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Branch v. FTC20 4 indicates the
scope of the Webb-Pomerene Act. In that case, the court held that
the FTC had jurisdiction under both the Federal Trade Commission
Act and the W\ebb-Pomerene Act to issue a cease and desist order
prohibiting a correspondence school operating in the United States
from employing unfair and fraudulent practices in soliciting students
in Latin American countries to the detriment of other United States
firms competing in the same field. The court found it irrelevant
that all the persons deceived were in Latin America.2 0  The FTC
was not seeking to protect the school's customers in Latin America
but to protect its domestic competitors. 20 6 Since § 4 of the Webb-
Pomerene Act is a "remedial statute" designed to "free foreign com-
merce of unfair trade practices," the court decided to construe it
liberally in order to effectuate the congressional purpose.20 7
Branch suggests that actions brought under the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act are not likely to be tested according to the Sherman Act's
substantial-effect standard. In Branch the FTC's jurisdiction to issue
a cease and desist order prohibiting the deceptive overseas practices
abroad of the American correspondence school was based merely on
a showing that a few other American correspondence schools did
business in the same region and might be injured by the defendant's
conduct.208 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the Lanham
Act, which prohibits "unfair competition" in trademarks, 20 gives
federal courts jurisdiction to award an American corporation relief for
201. 15 U.S.C. § 64 (1970).
202. W. FUGATE, supra note 97, § 7.2.
203: Id. § 7.1, at 224. This paradox has not made judicial application of the Act
easy. See United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 66-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
204. 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
205. Id. at 34-35.
206. Id. at 35.
207. Id. at 36.
208. Id. at 34-35.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
248
Vol. 86: 215, 1976
Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad
trademark infringement perpetrated overseas by an American citizen.21 0
The only injury alleged was potential damage to the plaintiff's reputa-
tion at home and abroad.-2 11 These cases indicate that, in applying
statutes providing extraterritorial jurisdiction, courts tend to require
the same showing of injury as they would if the conduct had occurred
within the United States.
The Branch holding implies that overseas payments would consti-
tute a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act if other Ameri-
can firms operated in the same foreign area.2 12 Extraterritorial appli-
cation would be particularly justified if the payments in question
were likely to subject other American firms to demands for similar
"fees" or were likely to damage competition among American firms
in any other way. Whether considered in pari materia with the Clay-
ton Act or as an independent prohibition of unfair methods of com-
petition, § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act seems to provide
solid statutory foundation for governmental efforts to control overseas
payments.2 13
E. Potential Antitrust Defendants and Plaintiffs
If an overseas payment suit were brought under one or more of
the antitrust provisions discussed in the preceding three sections, a
variety of parties could be litigants. With the possible exception of
the recipient foreign government, 214 virtually every entity or indi-
vidual involved in the payment could be a defendant in the suit. The
American corporation whose funds were used to make the payment
210. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). The Court cited Branch in
support of its extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act. Id. at 286.
211. Id. at 286.
212. Congressional testimony by a Lockheed official inadvertently demonstrated the
need for a broad conception of the effect of overseas payments. See Foreign Policy Hear-
igs, supra note 6, at 374 (quoted note 226 infra).
213. Although the FTC's mandate is broad and its extraterritorial authority estab-
lished, it may be hampered in combating some overseas payments because of a limit on
its subpoena powers. The subpoena power of the FTC is restricted to the "attendance
of witnesses, and the production of . . . documentary evidence . . . from any place in
the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The same language in the
Securities Act of 1933, id. § 77s(b) (1970), has been construed to allow the compulsory
production of documents situated outside the United States as long as the party directed
to produce the documents is served with the subpoena within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States. See SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir.
1915). Even this statutory construction, however, would not authorize federal courts to
issue commissions or letters rogatory to obtain evidence abroad for the FTC where the
custodian could not be served within the United States. In this regard the FTC has more
limited evidence-gathering power than either the Department of Justice or a private
litigant. See note 227 infra.
214. See pp. 233-35 supra.
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would be the most likely defendant, particularly if the payment was
made either directly from corporate coffers or through a fully con-
trolled subsidiary. An independent subsidiary or a consulting organiza-
tion2 1 5 over which the court could obtain personal jurisdiction 210
might be a more likely defendant if the payment was made indirectly
or with little or no approval by headquarters. Finally, responsible
individuals, such as corporate officers and directors, sales agents,
brokers, and other intermediaries might be liable for their role in the
unlawful transaction.
Whether or not the Justice Department or the FTC decides to bring
an action against these potential defendants, a number of private
parties could seek legal or equitable remedies for violation of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. 217 Under § 4 of the Clayton Act218 a
"person" 219 has standing to sue for treble damages if, by reason of
an antitrust violation, that person has suffered injury to "his business
or property." The Supreme Court has not made a definitive interpre-
tation of this injury requirement, and the lower federal courts have
proposed diverse standards: requiring the injury to be a "direct" result
of the violation; 220 requiring the plaintiff to be within the "target area"
of the violation; 221 or requiring the plaintiff's interest to be within the
215. For examples of overseas payments by subsidiaries and consulting organizations,
see notes 14, 20 & 21 supra.
216. For a discussion of means by which courts can obtain personal jurisdiction
over a party located abroad, see ABA, ANTiTRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 360-64 (1975).
217. The Federal Trade Commission Act generally has been held not to imply a
private cause of action. E.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
But see Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586-88 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (finding private
cause of action where acts complained of by consumers had been object of prior FTC
cease and desist order).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
219. By statutory definition, the term includes not only natural persons but also
American and foreign corporations and associations. Id. § 12 (1970). American states have
been held to have standing under § 4 in their proprietary capacities. Georgia v. Evans,
316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (under predecessor to § 4, state held entitled to bring treble
damage action against members of alleged price-fixing conspiracy from which it had
purchased asphalt). The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (90 Stat. 1394), amends § 4 of the Clayton Act to authorize
a state to bring parens patriae actions on behalf of natural persons residing in the state
who have been injured by violations of certain Sherman or Clayton Act provisions.
The amendment does not authorize patens patriae actions to be brought for violations
of the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 4 standing has also been granted to foreign gov-
ernments. See pp. 252-53 infra.
220. The leading statement of this traditional test is Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910), which dismissed a treble damage action brought by a
stockholder-creditor of an injured corporation under the predecessor to § 4. The test
remains viable in the Third Circuit. See Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97-98
(3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2651 (1976).
221. This test originated in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Karseal Corp. v. Rich-
field Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 364-65 (9th Cir. 1955), which held that an automobile
250
Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad
zone of interests protected by the statute allegedly violated.22 Re-
gardless of which of the proposed standards is applied, it is clear that
§ 4 suits can be brought not only by direct competitors of the defen-
dant but also by other parties that have suffered economic injury.223
Furthermore, § 16 of the Clayton Act22 4 gives any "person" or "firm"
threatened with injury by an impending or continuing antitrust vio-
lation the right to enjoin the lawbreaking. Standing under § 16 is
broader than under § 4: a party suffering any injury cognizable in
equity meets the § 16 standing requirement. 22 5
The liberal conception of standing recognized under §§ 4 and 16 is
particularly appropriate for private actions to redress injuries suf-
fered or about to be suffered by payments made abroad. Overseas pay-
polish manufacturer had standing to sue a producer of petroleum products for entering
into exclusive contracts with independent gasoline stations for accessories not including
plaintiff's polish. The test was recently reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit, and it has
been adopted by other courts of appeals. See Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418,
425-26 (9th Cir. 1975); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Sanitary
Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1966)
(Blackmun, J.); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc., v. Newton, 360 F.2d
414, 418 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
222. This test was recently proposed in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d
1142, 1149-51 (6th Cir. 1975), which held that three real estate inmestinent companies
had standing to sue a gasoline supplier for failure to comply with an oral agreement
to finance their acquisition of gasoline stations. For a critique of Malamtd and a re iew
of the case law on § 4 standing, see Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud,
51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 374 (1976).
223. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1969) (loss of profits
due to price discrimination by plaintiff's supplier, which was also supplier, three times
removed, of plaintiff's competitor, held actionable under § 4). Shareholders, however,
have been held not to be persons with standing to sue under § 4 for injuries sustained
by their corporation because of the anticompetitive conduct of other firms. E.g., Kauffman
v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 732-34 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), as amended by Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 91-435, [1976] U.S. CoDE CoNc.. & AD. NEWS (90 Stat. 1394).
225. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-61 (1972) (state not entitled to
bring § 4 parens patriae suit for damage to its general economy; dicta suggest § 16
might not be so limited); Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 129-31 (1969) (party
incapable of proving actual injury required by § 4 may still be entitled to § 16 in-
junction if "significant threat of injury" is demonstrable); Burch v. Good)ear T ire &
Rubber Co., 420 F. Supp. 82, 87-90 (D. Md. 1976) (state entitled to bring § 16 parens
patriae suit for damage to its general economy).
Although § 16 standing is broader than § 4 standing, a corporation bringing a § 16
suit to enjoin another firm's questionable payments might be met successfully with a
defense generally not allowed under § 4: the "unclean hands" defense. Compare Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951) (alleged antitrust
violations by plaintiff did not immunize defendants from § 4 suit) with Heldman v.
United States Lawn Tennis Ass'n, 354 F. Supp. 1241, 1249, 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (in-
junctive relief under § 16 denied plaintiff who had not acted in good faith in
situation that gaie rise to claim). The "unclean hands" defense would likely be raised
if the plaintiff in the overseas payments suit had itself been involved in questionable
payments.
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ments may often adversely affect American firms operating in the
same geographical area, though not competing in the same product
market. If, for example, a corporation induces a foreign government
to expend certain resources on "guns" rather than "butter," not only
competitive manufacturers of armaments but also producers of non-
military goods may be injured.2 - Or, if one major American firm in
a foreign country makes payments to government officials as a matter
of course, other American firms in the country, regardless of the
goods or services they produce, may be more likely than otherwise
to find themselves importuned to make similar payments. Thus, in
many instances of overseas payments, noncompetitors might qualify
for standing to bring treble damage or injunctive suits against anti-
trust violators. Moreover, if the evidence to support their allegations
exists, albeit in the hands of individuals or corporations abroad, there
are procedures to facilitate its discovery.227
A recent seminal Eighth Circuit decision raises the possibility
of another class of antitrust plaintiffs: the foreign governments them-
selves. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,228 a foreign government
brought a § 4 suit against members of an alleged price-fixing con-
spiracy from which it had purchased antibiotics. The court held that
just as American states qualify as persons entitled to sue under § 4,
226. The testimony of a Lockheed representative was revealing in this regard:
Senator CHURCH. . . . [W]hy do you even pay commissions or kickbacks or
bribes when you don't even have a competitor for this plane?
Mr. COWDEN. Because we are frequently competing not necessarily with another
airplane just like ours, but we are competing for the sales dollars that would be
spent on something else.
Senator CHURCH. Such as?
Mr. COWDEN. Such as fighter airplanes, such as tanks, such as guns.
Senator CHURCH. That is an extraordinary argument. Such as Kellogg Corn
Flakes .... [W]hat you are really saying then is if we don't get their dollars, they
might spend them for something unrelated to aircraft. It is not the competition
for aircraft that is involved.
Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 374.
227. A private plaintiff, no less than the Justice Department in its civil antitrust pro-
ceedings, can call upon the panoply of powers vested in the federal courts. A federal
court, for example, is empowered to compel American nationals rcsiding abroad to
appear and produce documents. See 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1970); FrD. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2).
Or, where the testimony of a foreign national is needed, a deposition can be taken
by either notice or commission, where the deponent consents or foreign law puts its
judicial machinery at the disposal of alien litigants, or by letter rogatory issued by a
United States court and transmitted to a foreign tribunal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(2)
(1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b), 32(a)(3)(B). For a discussion of Narious methods of ob-
taining evidence from abroad, see 16L J. VON KALINOWSKr, BUSINEss ORGANIZATIONS:
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 94.09 (1976); Smit, International Co-operation
in Civil Litigation, 9 NEDERLANDS TiJDscnFr VOOR INTERNATIONAAI. RECiT 137, 112-43
(1962).
228. 1976-1 Trade Cas. jf 60,892 (8th Cir. 1976), af'g In re Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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so do foreign governments.2 29 Furthermore, although the court in an
earlier ruling in the same case dismissed a parens patriae claim
brought by several foreign governments on behalf of their nationals
injured by the alleged price-fixing conspiracy, the court indicated
that where the foreign government itself was injured it might be en-
titled to bring a class action on behalf of any of its injured citi-
zens.2 3 0 Thus, foreign governments may be permitted broad access to
United States courts in antitrust actions.2 31 Such access is particularly
likely to be exploited in those cases in which the cost of the corporate
payment was included in the contract price to the foreign government
and private purchasers. 232
IV. Ensuring Corporate Accountability:
Private Remedies Revisited
Although the antitrust laws do not by words or implication grant a
shareholder right of action against the lawbreaking management of
the shareholder's own corporation,233 the prospect of incurring liability
may enhance the success of common law derivative suits against
responsible officers and directors. The clearer the illegality of over-
seas payments, the more likely it is that the offending corporation
229. The reasoning of the Supreme Court case relied on in Pfizer, Georgia v. Evans,
316 U.S. 159 (1942), as well as the reasoning of the district court's opinion in Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions implies that the Pfizer holding was intended to apply only to actions
brought by foreign governments in their proprietary capacity. Since most overse.is pay-
ments involve governments precisely in that capacity, this implicit limitation of Pfizer
should not pose an obstacle to foreign government plaintiffs in payments suits. Less
clear is whether courts would be reluctant to award damages to a government for pro-
prietary losses stemming from the misdeeds of that government's officials.
The Pfizer court did not reach the question of a foreign government's standing
tinder § 16, but analogous case law concerning American states indicates that such
standing should be at least as extensive as that granted under § 4. See Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-61 (1972); Burch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
420 F. Supp. 82, 87-90 (D. Md. 1976).
230. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 620 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
950 (1976).
231. A foreign gosernment bringing an overseas payments suit in federal court would
thereby lose its sosereign immunity to related or offsetting counterclaims. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1607(b), (c) (West Dec. 1976 Pamphlet). Whether it would also be held to have waived
the act of state defense is less clear. Compare First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768-70 (1972) (Rehnquist and White, JJ., and Burger, C.J.) and id. at
770-72 (Douglas, J., concurring) with id. at 793-96 (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall & Black-
mun, JJ., dissenting).
232. Testimony of Lockheed officials indicates that this may be common practice.
See Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 6, at 352, 390; Lockheed Hearings, supra note
4, at 25.
233. See, e.g., Langsan v. Beam, 1975-2 Trade Cas. f 60,552 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (stock-
holder derivative suit based on antitrust violations dismissed; § 4 of Clayton Act held
not to regulate relations between corporation and its management).
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will be subject to public penalties, damage to reputation, and civil
awards in favor of various injured parties. Moreover, once the il-
legality of the payments is established, inability to prove net financial
loss need not foreclose recovery. A suitable restitutionary measure of
damages may be derived from the amount of authorized overseas pay-
ments or the amount of compensation received by responsible cor-
porate officials during the period of anticompetitive conduct.2 34
Recognizing the illegality of anticompetitive overseas payments may
aid shareholders bringing derivative suits in yet another way. Under
the Federal Rules, 235 a derivative suit cannot normally be brought
before the shareholder makes a demand that the corporate directors
or shareholders bring an action. 2 6 The directors' decision not to do so
is considered a matter of discretion; it can be challenged only on the
ground that it reflected bad faith, bias, or some other impairment
of business judgment. 37
Application of the business judgment rule in this context can pose
difficulties for shareholders bringing derivative suits against corporate
officers involved in overseas payments. In Gall v. Exxon Corp.,2 35 for
example, a district court indicated that a derivative suit arising from
an Exxon subsidiary's political contributions in Italy probably could
not be maintained in the face of a decision not to sue made by a
special committee of Exxon directors. The court noted the absence
of shareholder allegations of fraud, collusion, illegality, or ultra vires
conduct on the part of the special committee. 239 It further observed
that even if the payments were illegal, failure to sue the perpetrators
was not itself a violation of the law.24 0 In fact, however, the court
found "not a scintilla of evidence" that the payments were illegal
234. Courts might also approve of the derivative suit as a vehicle to challenge the
enforceability of severance pay or indemnification agreements between a corporation and
the officers responsible for the payments made abroad. These agreements may prove
costly to firms because corporate insurance policies have begun expressly to exclude
coverage for claims related to foreign payoffs. Wall St. J., July 12, 1976, at 1, col. 6. It is
predicted that insurance carriers will resist settlement of existing cases concerning such
payoffs. Id.
235. Fa. R. Civ. P. 23.1. See generally 3B MOORE'S FEDERP.L Paicricn 23.1.19 (2d ed.
1976).
236. The demand is only excused when it would clearly be in vain. See, e.g., Cathedral
Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1955).
237. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 927 (1966).
238. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
239. Id. at 516.
240. Id. at 517-18. In this way, the Gall court distinguished the Miller case, disussed
at p. 230 supra, in which failure to collect a debt was held to be an illegal campaign
contribution. Id. at 518 & n.19.
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under either Italian or American law.2 4 1 Having thus stressed the im-
probability of a successful derivative suit, the Gall court denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment and gave the plaintiff an
opportunity to test the impartiality of the special committee through
discovery.2 42
The reasoning in Gall, though perhaps justified by the facts of the
case, is not appropriate for most derivative suits likely to arise from
anticompetitive payments abroad. To the extent that such payments
constitute serious violations of the antitrust laws, the inherent an-
tagonism between a plaintiff shareholder and managerial defendants2- 3
is likely to be exacerbated. This is all the more probable where, as
was not the case in Gall, members of the board of directors have par-
ticipated or acquiesced in the illegal practices authorized by manage-
ment. As Judge Coffin of the First Circuit commented in a recent con-
curring opinion:
[The managerial acts attacked in the derivative suit] are alleged
to be illegal under federal antitrust laws. If I were to calibrate a
scale to measure the impact of varying improprieties, I would
rate such an allegation fairly high. I find it hard to imagine that
a director, [however] unaffiliated, who had participated, or . . .
knowingly acquiesced, in a major transaction, albeit for a cor-
porate purpose, would authorize a suit, effectively against him-
self, claiming that the transaction violated the federal antitrust
laws.2 44
Judicial skepticism about directors' decisions not to sue might be
appropriate even in the absence of evidence of directors' complicity
in the illegal conduct. First, the failure of the directors to discover
the corporation's overseas payments practices, particularly if they were
massive in scale, might be so grossly negligent as to call into question
their capacity to exercise good business judgment.24  Second, the typi-
241. Id. at 518.
242. Id. at 519-20. Courts are generally reluctant to dismiss a derivative suit before
the plaintiff shareholder has had an opportunity to pursue discovery. See, e.g., Lasker
v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca
di Credito Finanziario, 69 F.R.D. 592, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
243. See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 95 (1957).
244. In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 269 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 857 (1973) (concurring opinion).
245. Cf. Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1161 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975) (dictum) ("tT]he directors of a corporation may not totally
abandon their duties to the corporation or close their eyes to what is going on about
them .... "); Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217, 231 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (directors negligent
for not discovering self-dealing by inside directors; failure characterized as total abdi-
cation of managerial duties).
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cally close association of a corporation's directors with its executives
might color the directors' views of the desirability of suing executives
who allegedly violated the law to the corporation's detriment.246
Finally, the clearer the illegality and the larger the potential recovery,
the more the directors' decision not to sue would be tantamount to
a breach of trustY' 7 Any one of these considerations might cause a
court to override the decision of the directors and sustain a share-
holder derivative suit for damages, injunction, or restitution.
Conclusion
In the wake of the controversial disclosures of questionable pay-
ments abroad, the response of both the private and the public sectors
has been slow and insufficient. With a few notable exceptions,241
members of the business community do not seem animated by a con-
viction that overseas payments must be halted.2 49 The cautious ap-
proach of the President's Task Force, the limited enforcement efforts
of the SEC, and the inconclusive action in Congress testify to the in-
adequacy of present governmental approaches to the problem.
The antitrust approach endorsed in this article is an attractive al-
ternative for two reasons. First, it focuses on those payments that
have the most serious economic consequences for American firms and,
thereby, for American investors, consumers, and free enterprise gen-
246. See Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
665 (1940) (derivative suit maintainable where refusal to sue amounted to breach of
trust; directors "made common cause" with wrongdoing officer and tried to justify his
breach of duty); Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Mass. 1951) (expressing
doubt whether majority of directors can be "expected to weigh impartially a charge
against their accused colleagues"); M. FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OF-
FICERS AND DIRECTORS 175 (2d ed. 1974) ("The usual ties between all members of a
management group may, and perhaps should, induce a court to view [a decision not
to sue] with a degree of skepticism . ... )
247. Compare Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 177-78, 240 P.2d 421, 428
(1952) (derivative suit not maintainable where directors' decision not to sue was based
on fair weighing of possibility of recovery against cost of litigation in time, money,
and disruption of business) with Groel v. United Electric Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 624, 61
A. 1061, 1064 (Ch. 1905) (directors who deem it "inexpedient" to bring good cause of
action on behalf of corporation only "emphasize the breach of trust they are committing
by not doing so") and Epstein v. Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969, 981 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (dictum)
("Where there is a clear cause of action, a refusal to enforce it may constitute a breach
of trust on the part of the directors.")
248. See Bribes Hearings, supra note 1, at 18-19 (Ralph Nader, Center for the Study
of Responsive Law, referring to Stanley Marcus, chairman of the executive committee,
Neiman-Marcus Co., and Fred Allen, chairman of the board, Pitney-Bowes, Inc.).
249. See Wall St. J., July 9, 1976, at 1, col. 6. Indeed, Northrup Corporation, which
settled an SEC suit in 1975 by agreeing not to make further overseas bribes, subse-
quently admitted that $129,000 had been spent on payoffs after the consent decree
was signed. Id.
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erally. Second, it places in the hands of those most willing and able
to attack overseas payments effective legal weapons that can be wielded
without new legislation. It brings the broad powers of the Justice
Department and the FTC to bear on the problem, supplementing the
narrower authority of the SEC. Even more significantly, it enables
private parties to seek redress for injuries suffered as a result of ques-
tionable payments. American corporations that once saw no alternative
but to emulate the practices of the least scrupulous among them,
foreign governmental purchasers that ultimately shouldered the costs
of payoffs to their officials, and American shareholders who were
stunned by the improper expenditures authorized by their corpora-
tion's management-all may readily transform their concern into law-
suits. Perhaps when officers and directors are forcefully reminded that
overseas payments are not a victimless wrong they too will come to
view the practice as questionable.
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